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1.

INTRODUCTION

Numerous possible contexts can impel national governments to
start reparations programs. From the array of possibilities, this
Article focuses on reparations for the effects of a crisis that ravaged
a whole nation—for example civil war, genocide, dictatorship, or
apartheid—rather than on one discrete, odious deviation from the
norms of a functioning democracy. Isolated incidents can generate
urgent needs for repair, but the reparations under discussion in
this Article presume a more fundamental ambition: a declaration
of the nation’s past as broken, and its future in need of mending.1
The government of a nation, acknowledging grave strife in its
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helpful comments. A shorter version of this Article, published in THE GENDER OF
REPARATIONS (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2009), benefited from the editorial attentions
and leadership of Ruth Rubio-Marín, Pablo de Greiff, and Roger Duffie of the
International Center for Transitional Justice. I thank the ICTJ for its support.
1 I remark on the problematic nature of “isolated incidents” in Anita
Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 499 &
n.331 (1997). This reservation noted, I mean to exclude for this purpose
reparations contexts such as the internment of Japanese citizens in the United
States during World War II, focusing instead on comprehensive national schemes
undertaken in a context of economic development.
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recent past, has committed itself to disbursing sums of money to
large numbers of its people as part of its transition to a stable civil
society.
Precedents for this undertaking provide models for the
subcategory of interest here, pecuniary reparations: that is,
programs that seek to identify and compensate individual citizenclaimants in recognition of human rights violations during the
recent past. Such recognition can take monetary form in transfer
payments to individuals. Among the countries that have been able
to distribute pecuniary reparations following national crises are
Argentina, which through legislation in 1994 appropriated
reparations for victims of forced disappearances and detentions
that took place from 1974 to 1983, paid in the form of bonds;2 Chile,
which in 1992 appropriated pension funds for the victims of
human rights violations that took place from 1973 to 1990;3 and
South Africa, which disbursed cash payments totaling U.S. $5.5
million to approximately 14,000 apartheid-era victims.4 In less
wealthy nations, including Peru, Rwanda, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and
Guatemala, governments have approved the provision of
monetary compensation to citizen-victims in the wake of their own
national crises, suggesting that pecuniary reparations hold appeal
as policy even in nations that are hard-pressed to finance a new
round of transfer payments.
When it opts for pecuniary reparations, a national government
necessarily rejects various alternative stances. It disagrees with
any onlookers who would say that the endeavor of reparation is
futile. It does not believe that money in particular cannot affect
meaningful reparation, and goes a step further by denying that
payments to individuals waste more money compared to collective

2 See María José Guembe, Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights
Violations: The Argentinean Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 21, 29–31
(Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (discussing the passage of laws
providing compensation to victims of human rights violations that occurred
between 1974 and 1983 and the valuation of the compensation provided).
3 See Elizabeth Lira, The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile,
in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 55, 83–85 (discussing the distribution of pensions
funds to peasants excluded from agrarian reform or expelled from their land
under the military regime).
4 See Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa,
in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 176, 188–89 (exploring the reparations debate in
post-apartheid South Africa and outlining recommendations for reparations).
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payments.5 Consistent with Pablo de Greiff’s panoramic chapter,
“Justice and Reparations,”6 this government has implicitly deemed
insufficient two significant constituents of transitional justice: nonmaterial reparations (such as an apology only)7 and disbursements
that pursue a collective goal (such as economic development) that
make individuals better off only indirectly.8
Economic development hovers in the wings behind a
reparations stage. Because reparations programs are frequently
established in contexts characterized by disarray and vulnerability,
they likely coexist with fragile national economies, shaky financial
institutions, uncertain or erratic regulation of these financial
institutions and related commercial practices, patchy telephony,
and general technological underdevelopment. Significant physical
danger might remain around the nation’s buildings, modes of
transport, and public spaces. Systemic human rights violations for
which states have acknowledged responsibility are usually part of
a larger devastation that did not leave the rule of law unaffected
and had harmful effects on both the safety and protection of
investment capital and the physical safety of civilian citizens.9
See infra notes 24–25, 31, and accompanying text (discussing these debates
over reparations fundamentals).
6 See Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 451
(developing an understanding of reparations that can be applied to the resolution
of “massive and systematic cases of abuse”).
7 Pope John Paul II, for example, once proclaimed an apology for the injuries
done to Africa by Christian Europe. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Pope Apologizes to Africans
for Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1985, at A3 (reporting on speech to Cameroonian
intellectuals in which Pope John Paul II asked for “pardon from our African
brothers who suffered so much because of the trade in blacks”).
8 After World War II, for example, Japan invested in the economies of Burma,
the Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam pursuant to treaties whose names
included the word “reparations.”
9
See HANS DIETER SEIBEL, FROM RECIPIENTS OF REPARATION PAYMENTS TO
SHAREHOLDERS OF MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS: A STUDY OF THE POSSIBLE RELATIONS
BETWEEN REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND MICROFINANCE 2
(2003) (paper presented at The Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Study and
Conference Center “Villa Serbelloni”) [hereinafter SEIBEL, REPARATIONS
SHAREHOLDERS], available at http://www.uni-koeln.de/ew-fak/aef/08-2005/2003
-6%20ICTJ%20Microfinance.pdf.
5

In a total crisis, the state virtually ceases to exist, national economies
disintegrate, and social and political structures melt away. A significant
number of people are exposed to a day-to-day struggle for survival,
often separated from their homes and deprived of their usual sources of
livelihood. In particular, total crisis means that national governmental
and civil society organizations have been destroyed; the production and
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A government certain of its plan to make transfer payments to
victims could decide to wait for some marker of stability to arrive
before forming its plan. But the wait might be too long, especially
for a government that wants to capitalize on some of the
advantages of economic reparations. If (contrary to rhetoric heard
from some transitional governments), far from having to choose
between reparations programs and development programs, a
nation could design a reparations program in a way that
simultaneously serves developmental goals, the advantages of
moving swiftly forward become plain. The prospect of achieving
both reparation and development is realistic if one mode of
pecuniary repair, “microcredit” or “microfinance,”10 is indeed as
salutary as its many admirers believe.
That individuals benefit from receiving money is axiomatic. A
financial institution that profits from such transactions with
individuals will in turn regard itself as better off. When enough
people join this new expansion of the banking business, gains
spread beyond parties to the deals.
Many observers believe that gains rooted in small banking
transactions change the world. The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize went
not to treaty-signers or war-renouncers but jointly to an economist
and the high-yield bank he founded, which had about $564,000,000
on deposit at the time of the award.11 “Lasting peace cannot be
achieved unless large groups find ways to break out of poverty,”
the Norwegian Nobel Committee said in its announcement of the
prize. “Micro-credit is one such means. Development from below
also serves to advance democracy and human rights.” The
Committee added that microcredit was “an important liberating

market distribution of goods and services has been disrupted;
institutional capacity for policy decision and planning at [the] national
level has been eliminated or curtailed . . . [and] large numbers of
individuals have been physically and socially displaced and were subject
to traumatizing experiences of violence.
Id.
10 See infra Section 3.1.1 (providing working definitions of “microcredit” and
“microfinance”).
11 See Grameen Bank at a Glance, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php
?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175 (last visited Oct. 26, 2009)
(providing an introduction to the operations and ownership of the Grameen bank,
which now has 2559 branches covering 84,691 villages).
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force in societies where women in particular have to struggle
against repressive social and economic conditions.”12
As scholars have established, the effort to achieve reparation
following national crisis is at least hobbled, if not defeated, by
conceptions of agency, identity, and recognition that take
inadequate note of women’s experiences and consciousness.13
Human rights, procedural rights, the law of war, acts of state,
public discourse, dignity, distributive justice, and everything else
that occupies the polity are all women’s issues as well. They give
rise to entitlements for both men and women, as individual citizens
and stakeholders in the national collective.
If reparations foster healing, then postponing reparations
retards healing; thus, the healthier course would be to install a
reparations scheme as soon as enough stability in the nation exists
to make it possible. The wait for wealth is too long. When the
familiar reparations conditions are present—a strife-torn past, an
optimistic present, and a national economy battered or frail
enough to need intervention—a program committed to the transfer
of funds to individuals becomes better positioned to attain repair if
it can transfer money in a way that would strengthen the emergent
civil society. Expenditures that merely put money in the hands of
victims would be resisted, as dissenters within the government
could invoke lack of resources, the existence of competing and
legitimate reconstruction needs, and the divisiveness inherent in
compensating only a few people.
The political value of reparations money increases when
reparations can augment national wealth as well as compensate
victims for human rights abuses. One might have thought that a
reparations plan that transfers money must choose between (a)
payments to repair past traumas or (b) investments in economic
development, but not (a) and (b) both. As this Article will try to
demonstrate, however, a reparations plan need not necessarily
12 See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, The Nobel Peace Prize for
2006 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes
/peace/laureates/2006/press.html (claiming that microcredit would have to play
a major part in any effort to alleviate poverty).
13 The leading writer on this subject is the Spanish constitutional scholar Ruth
Rubio-Marín. See Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Gender of Reparations: Setting the Agenda,
in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN? GENDER AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS 20 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2006); Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Gender of
Reparations in Transitional Societies, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING
SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 63 (Ruth
Rubio-Marín ed., 2009) [hereinafter Transitional Societies].
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relinquish either goal. Through reparations, governments can
simultaneously pursue pecuniary recompense to individuals and
economic gain to the nation.
The presence of entitlements amenable to monetary expression
suggests that planners who make reparations policy ought to find
guidance in principles of the law related to compensation for
physical injury. Injured persons have been presenting claims for
pecuniary redress over millennia, in a range of contexts and legal
systems. The responses to their demands now form a transnational
common discourse, such that it becomes plausible to regard
pecuniary reparations as comparable to tort claims, no matter
where the wrongs occurred or which legal system will adjudicate
them. Accordingly, this Article offers an approach to pecuniary
reparations for human rights violations that draws support not
only from feminism in general and the idea of microfinance as
empowerment for women in particular, but also from tort theory.
Anyone who proposes any form of pecuniary reparations, not
just the microfinance variety advocated here, must first establish
the rightness of paying money to individuals. Section 2 defends
economic compensation as a remedy for injured persons as
reparative of a past national crisis.
Section 3 advocates
microfinance in particular, in contrast to other (lesser) means of
transferring payments to individual recipients.
Readers who accept the argument for pecuniary redress made
in Section 2, and the argument for microfinance as laid out in
Section 3, move to the last step of the Article, which is to ask the
woman question: how would reparations in the form of
microfinance advance gender equality? Section 4 provides an
introduction to microfinance as constitutive of security and
freedom. We have already noted the Nobel Committee citation
that took as axiomatic the power of “micro-credit” to improve the
lives of poor women.14 Additional detail gathered in Section 5
supports that view and establishes that the association between
microfinance and gender equality becomes even stronger in the
reparations context.

14

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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ECONOMIC COMPENSATION FOR INDIVIDUALS POST-CRISIS
THROUGH THE RULE OF LAW

Reparations programs following national crises engage with
and bear on the law in several distinct ways. International law
creates at least a basis if not a mandate for reparations that can take
a pecuniary form. Numerous legal instruments—the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment; the
Convention on the Rights of the Child; the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
the American Convention on Human Rights; and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights—declare a right to redress
for human rights violations.15 Broadly understood, reparations
constitute one form of such a legal remedy.
The law is intertwined with every stage of the reparations
process, from the early design of each program to its conclusion.
Legislation creates reparations schemes.16 National laws decree
what the government may do and which individuals will
participate in processes. Judges, advocates, and administrative
lawyers play leadership roles in the implementation of reparations
measures. Even when laws and lawyers are absent from a
particular locus of reparations, a discourse associated with law—
words like rights and justice—will likely be present, and
reparations themselves serve as instruments to rebuild or install a
rule of law.
Although these iterations of law in reparations emphasize
“public” law—especially international law, human rights law, and
criminal law—the identification of individual victims also invokes
a field of “private” law, the law of personal injuries. Tort law
provides for compensation to persons injured by wrongful
conduct.
Within law, it contains its own jurisprudence—a

15 See HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION [Australia],
SOCIAL JUSTICE REPORT 2000, ch. 5, available at http://www.humanrights.gov.ru
/social-justice/sj-report/sjreport100/chap5.html (criticizing the Australian
government for rejecting a formal national apology, refusing to consider monetary
forms of compensation, and stating that citizen litigation is sufficient to achieve
reparations).
16 For Example, HANDBOOK, supra note 2, contains nearly three hundred
pages of primary documents and legislation.
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perspective on law-based responsibility that—while compatible
with the public law governing states, crimes, and assertions of
human rights violations—brings its own concerns to the
assignment of entitlements and responsibilities.
This
jurisprudence provides for torts-focused views on particular
choices that face reparations planners.
2.1. Compensation as a Constituent of Doing Justice
International law recognizes a variety of means, going beyond
money, to effect repair following violations of human rights. In
2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a report
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights declaring that
reparations to or in respect of victims encompass “restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition.”17 The last two are particularly broad categories that
include a range of measures: verification of facts and disclosure of
truth, searches for corpses, public apologies, tributes to victims,
civilian control of the military, an independent judiciary, and the
installation of codes of conduct and ethical norms.18
A torts perspective on reparations casts no slight on these
ambitious ends by focusing on a discrete portion of them. The
torts vantage point shares Pablo de Greiff’s view that the word
reparations “refer[s] to measures that provide benefits to victims
directly.”19 It emphasizes compensation more than restitution,
while acknowledging overlap between these two categories.20
Most fundamentally, it emphasizes the need for money (or its
equivalent) to change hands. An entity accepting responsibility for
past wrongs—usually a government—disburses money; victims or
their heirs receive it.

G.A. RES. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006).
See id., ¶¶ 22–23 (detailing the measures that “satisfaction” and
“guarantees of non-repetition” should include).
19 de Greiff, supra note 6, at 453.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(a) (1979) (asserting that the first
principle of tort actions is “to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for
harms”). On the ranking of compensation ahead of restitution, see id., cmt. a
(noting that tort law, unlike the law of unjust enrichment, does not focus on the
benefit that the defendant received: “This first purpose of tort law leads to
compensatory damages.”). See also John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort
Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (2006) (parsing
distinctions between compensation and indemnification, which parallel
distinctions between full and fair compensation).
17
18
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The monetary nexus is integral to torts. In its use of the term
“damages” for “the monetary award for legally recognized
harm,”21 tort law aspires to integrate wrongs and rights through
the disbursement and receipt of money. This implicit unity
appears more explicitly in the American compendium Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which defines damages as “a sum of money
awarded to a person injured by the tort of another.”22 The
Restatement declares that money is awarded to vindicate the ideals
of tort law generally:
The rules for determining the measure of damages in tort
are based upon the purposes for which actions of tort are
maintainable. These purposes are:
(a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for
harms;
(b) to determine rights;
(c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct; and
(d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and
unlawful self-help.23
In contrast to this claim of reparative ambition and possibility,
several writers have singled out monetary compensation as
uniquely problematic among possible means of reparation
following a national crisis. Taking the perspective of a victim, they
question the reparative effect of receiving cash from a distant
government.24 Taking the perspective of a payer-planner or
21 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1047 (2000) (explaining that restitution
and injunction are distinct from damages).
22 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902 (1979).
23 Id. § 901.
24 Women are prominent among the money-skeptics. See, e.g., Roman David
& Susanne Choi Yuk-Ping, Victims on Transitional Justice: Lessons from the
Reparation of Human Rights Abuses in the Czech Republic, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 392, 403
(2005) (noting that some mothers of disappeared sons in Argentina refused
financial compensation on the ground that it would “diminish their claims for
truth and justice”); see also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 103 (1998)
(arguing with respect to reparations paid to survivors of Japanese-American
internment that “reparations fall short of repairing victims or social relationships
after violence” and questioning whether compensation is the most obvious need
of victims); id. at 110 (“Social and religious meanings rather than economic values
lie at the heart of reparations”); Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A
Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: Examining the September 11th
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observer, they doubt that disbursements to individuals constitute a
priority for a nation as it emerges from chaos and crisis.25
A torts-centered response to these criticisms would insist that
while money is indeed never sufficient to repair serious violations
of human rights, it is still necessary.
Truth commissions,
apologies, forward-looking rhetoric, newly-elected democratic
governments committed to change, and other non-pecuniary
measures are crucial to the rebuilding of societies in transition.
Nevertheless, the currency of torts redress is literally found in
currency. Moreover, because human rights violations trammel on
persons as individuals, the currency of reparations must go to
them directly and personally. Collective payments and programs,
though undoubtedly salubrious, do not discharge this obligation.
Torts perspectives focus on a crucial half of a balance that
might otherwise be overlooked.
According to de Greiff,
reparations payments without truth-telling can look like “‘blood
money’” to victims, whereas without payments, truth-telling can
look like “cheap talk.”26 Truth-telling ceases to be cheap talk when
it includes the receipt and the disbursement of reparations monies.
The value of receipt is at one level obvious—for most people, to
have more money is better than to have less. The rare recipient
who disagrees, and deems money odious, is free to repudiate or
give away her payment.27
Disbursement yields its own benefits to the society and its
government. Instrumentalists may note that by declaring a
financial obligation that a successor regime owes to victims, these
payments open the possibility of deterrence. Even though primary
wrongdoers are likely unavailable to share in the obligation, a
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 361 (2003) (emphasizing that
from a victim’s point of view, monetary compensation can never be adequate and
“moral accountability” is key for satisfactory compensation).
25 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 24, at 73 (explaining that even though South
Africa’s TRC employs a “public process of acknowledgment” of atrocities,
psychological assistance and therapy may also be useful); see also Maryam Kamali,
Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison of Transitional Justice in
East Germany and South Africa, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 89, 129 n.173 (2001)
(describing how countries that cannot afford to pay large sums of monetary
reparations may supplement compensation with counseling and therapy in order
to foster individual healing).
26 See de Greiff, supra note 6, at 461 (explaining the complex means by which
reparations complement other processes that occur in transitional justice).
27 Exploring another level, I will presently take up the question of how to
refine the payment of money to enhance its gains. See infra Section 4.
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pecuniary program of reparations establishes ledgers that can be
used in the future if wrongdoer-controlled assets become
accessible. Since technological innovation has made recordkeeping
cheaper and hidden wealth easier to uncover, the establishment of
these ledgers declares that a government not only has the
machinery but also the will to find, catalogue, and reallocate the
wealth that human rights violators wrongly hold. For noninstrumentalists and instrumentalists alike, ledgers affirm an ideal
of governmental responsibility not only to apologize and tell the
truth, but also to pay for misdeeds as measured in wrongs and
rights. The endeavor of determining a monetary amount to be
paid, both in the aggregate and to each recipient, makes the reality
of past wrongs concrete and visible even before any funds are
transferred.28
2.2. Not Just Money: Torts as Recognition
We have noted the dichotomy that casts the phrase “blood
money” as descriptive of monetary compensation that excludes
truth-telling, and “cheap talk” as the complementary dismissive
phrase for the inverse phenomenon. Monetary compensation and
truth-telling in this view are incomplete halves, each needing the
other to forestall a well-earned pejorative and effect real
reparation. How can the two come together? The annals of
reparations present several possibilities, to which the tort-focused
approach of this Article adds its own perspective. For this
purpose, tort law emphatically does not reduce to the payment of
damages. It concerns itself at least as much with the agency of the
victim and the generation of recognition for an affront.
Mere compensation has never accounted for all of what tort
law and policy seek to accomplish. Any law-based scheme that
purports to compensate without recognition of the individual
behind a claim—a person who holds rights and freedoms—is
abjuring torts for something else.29 Tort law endeavors to speak for

28 Cf. Christian Sundquist, Critical Praxis, Spirit Healing, and Community
Activism: Preserving a Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 659, 697 (2003) (arguing that reparations for African-Americans ought to take
pecuniary form in order to highlight the economic privileges of white Americans,
to “foster community activism,” and to emphasize the need among recipients for
economic self-sufficiency).
29 See generally STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY
LAW: NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS
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victims by supporting them as they speak for themselves.
Complaint-initiated engagement of the legal system is a hallmark
of tort, and has the capacity to alter the status quo before the
government takes any initiative.30
This pride of torts notwithstanding, reparations planners start
their work familiar with the protest that the central tort equation—
approximately, wrongs equals damages equals money—does not
align with injury as victims have experienced it. In her comparison
of pecuniary versus non-pecuniary reparations schemes, Naomi
Roht-Arriaza relates a useful survey of recipients in Latin America
and South America. Though she is sympathetic to both types of
reparations, Roht-Arriaza reports that victims value non-pecuniary
measures much more than cash:
Over and over again, in interviews and in interactions with
therapists, victims ask for official and societal
acknowledgment that they were wronged, restoration of
their good name, knowledge of who and how it was done,
and justice and moral reparations. Victims are much more
ambivalent about monetary reparations. On the one hand,
a number of victims and organizations of family members
refused all money as “blood money” intended to silence
them and to deflect attention from the larger issues of
impunity and societal recognition. On the other, some
victims saw material reparations as just recognition by the
state of the harm caused, money that would otherwise go to
the state. All agreed that compensation was never enough,
or even the most important thing.31
When asked why a reparations plan should spend scarce
resources on a measure that recipients have declared would not by
itself satisfy them, a defender of torts perspectives on reparations
may need to say more than pecunia non olet.32 This defender can

(1989) (discussing alternative routes to the ends associated with torts, especially
compensation and deterrence).
30 See generally Anita Bernstein, Complaints, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 37 (2000)
(arguing that complaints initiate the process of individual healing as well as
encourage societal improvements).
31 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 180–81 (2004).
32 Latin: Cash will be welcomed by those who receive it; “money has no
odor.”
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point out that a tort approach does not reduce reparations to cash
transfers.
An article from a bygone era is instructive on this point.
Maurice Rosenberg, a civil procedure scholar, once contended that
government had a role to play as a facilitator and supporter of
personal injury claims.33 The notion sounds jarring today, at least
in the United States.34 Nevertheless, in 1971 Rosenberg envisioned
government intervention to assert the interests of injured citizens.
He proposed a new ministry named the Department of Economic
Justice that would pay out cash in response to reports of injury.35
This utopian department would have the power to go after the
wrongdoers it identified as responsible, taking “legal action
appropriate to the situation—including wholesale (and hence,
economically worthwhile) suits to recover amounts it had already
paid out administratively, along with costs, interest, and other
economic sanctions.”36
Anyone inclined to deem this suggestion a naïve, idle dream
about benevolence in support of injury claims of other people
should remember that the principle of vicarious liability is heeded
in daily practice around the developed world.37 All agree that an
entity that did not participate directly or personally in wrongdoing
may nevertheless be required, without any finding of its own fault,
to compensate victims who suffered at the hands of individual
wrongdoers. The best-known example of vicarious liability is
respondeat superior, a form of strict liability that is prevalent
worldwide. In the United States, business entities can also take on

33 See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that are Civil to Promote
Justice that is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971) (discussing the role of courts
and judicial administration and the need for improvement in the system’s ability
to root out evil and effect “good” procedures).
34 In contemporary American debates, liberals defend tort law as it is
currently practiced and associate proposals to reform it with business interests.
See Stephen D. Sugarman, Ideological Flip-Flop: American Liberals are Now the
Primary Supporters of Tort Law 13 (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper, Paper
No. 925244, Jan. 17, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=925244 (explaining that the main supporters of the fault-based torts
system in the United States are on the left side of the political spectrum).
35 See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 813–14 (suggesting an example of a
departure from the more adversarial methods of seeking reparations).
36 Id. at 814.
37 Thanks to Mark Geistfeld, for clarifying this point, and to John Owen
Haley for his insights into the relation between subrogation and torts-thinking
about reparations, which inform these paragraphs.
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vicarious liability by succession.
They might, through the
purchase of corporate assets, gain ownership of a business’s
liabilities, as well.38 After being compelled to pay damages
pursuant to vicarious liability, an entity has the prerogative to seek
indemnification from the person responsible for having committed
the more fundamental, primary wrong.39 In this light, it becomes
plausible to envision a unit within a national government
(probably not named the Department of Economic Justice) taking
on the role of a successor government, empowered to recoup
national assets that have been plundered by notorious wrongdoers.
Disgraced and culpable individuals may have lost their power
to inflict harm on their fellow citizens, but they may own property
sufficient to pay for some of their past harms. For example, the
rumor that Augusto Pinochet had stashed nine tons of gold in a
Hong Kong bank vault proved to be untrue, but the estimate of $28
million deposited in foreign accounts was well founded.40 This
sum could have made an impact on Chile’s reparations program.41
One human rights group has tried to force a reckoning of the gains
amassed by the multinational corporations that supported the
apartheid regime while doing business in South Africa the subject
of another reparations program.42 Haile Mengistu Meriam, under
38 See generally Symposium, Multinational Corporations and Cross Border
Conflicts: Nationality, Veil Piercing, and Successor Liability, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 221
(1995) (discussing divergence between U.S. and U.K. law on the issue of successor
liability and how the notion of successor liability is more developed in the United
States).
39 The common law entitles an entity defendant to recover against an
individual wrongdoer for monies that the entity paid to a third party as
compensation for physical injuries. See Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co.,
[1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.) (U.K.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (discussing how an
employer who is required to pay damages after being found liable may seek
indemnification from his employee); Saranillo v. Silva, 889 P.2d 685, 697 (Haw.
1995) (explaining that employers who are found liable under respondeat superior
may receive indemnification from their employees); Jackson v. Associated Dry
Goods Corp., 192 N.E.2d 167, 169 (N.Y. 1963) (“It is well established that the
culpability of the party seeking indemnity determines whether recovery over will
be permitted.”) (citation omitted).
40 Eva Vergara & Patrick J. McDonnell, No Pinochet Gold Hoard, Bank Says,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at A7.
41 See Lira, supra note 3, at 56, 59.
42 See Colvin, supra note 4, at 199.

Jubilee South Africa has also pointed out that the multinational
corporations that helped to finance the apartheid government in its final,
most repressive years removed roughly R3 billion (US $375,000,000) a
year between 1985 and 1993 from the country. Jubilee argues that if 1.5
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whose rule an estimated half a million civilians were killed in
Ethiopia, including political dissidents killed by his military junta
in the 1970s, took up residence in Zimbabwe and enjoyed access to
“a free apartment and a fleet of luxury cars” that could have been
liquidated to pay reparations to victims’ families.43 Too poor to
effect its limited reparations scheme that had budgeted about
$3,500,000,44 Haiti could certainly use some of the money that the
Duvalier family embezzled before fleeing, even if the astounding
estimate of “up to US $900 million”45 overstates what they stole.
In this torts-influenced reckoning, victims of human rights
violations would assert their claims and receive reparations
payments from governments to compensate for discrete
wrongdoings, with human malefactors in mind, but not in a
bloodless shuffle of papers. The government would accept
responsibility on its own behalf—either for having done wrong
itself or for not having fulfilled its duty to protect citizens from
active wrongdoers46—and also as a quasi-insurer making
payments for the wrongs of others, pursuant to its obligation. It
would pay reparations to citizen-victims without condescension,
valuing its right of indemnification against the persons and entities
that bear primary responsibility for the harm.
Conveying payments for wrongful violations of human agency
would thus signal not only an acknowledgment of responsibility
percent of these profits was returned each year for six years, financial
reparations at the level of the original TRC recommendations could be
paid.
Id. Jubilee also supported a lawsuit in the United States against several of these
corporations, arguing that they violated international law by exploiting cheap
labor and collaborating with armed enforcers of the apartheid government. In re
South African Apartheid Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(dismissing the action on the ground that plaintiffs did not demonstrate a
violation of international law).
43 Victor T. LeVine, Taylor Case Only a Start: Leaders Seldom Answer for Abuses,
but that May Be Changing, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2006, at B4.
44 One commentator does not attribute Haiti’s failure to implement a
program simply to its scarcity of resources, but concludes that the nation’s
poverty played an undisputed role. Alexander Segovia, The Reparations Proposals
of the Truth Commissions in El Salvador and Haiti: A History of Noncompliance, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 154, 164 (finding that other factors include the lack of
importance given to reparations by the different players in the domestic, national,
and international community).
45 Paul Hamel, Preventing Democracy in Haiti: Turning the Light Off at the End of
the Tunnel, PEACE MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2005, at 14.
46 Rubio-Marín, Transitional Societies, supra note 13, at 77.
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but a tacit pledge to pursue—or at least care about—the
reclamation of this money from the primary offenders. The tacit
pledge, implying that the giver values its payment, expresses
recognition of a particular historical event and the claim of right
that derives from a wrong. When the primary offenders gained the
holdings in question through theft, extortion, or wrongful seizure,
the retrieval effort also links the pathology of rights violation with
the pathology of plundering a nation’s wealth—a connection that
stands up for fiscal law and order along with human rights, and
thus could enhance the reparations program in the eyes of foreign
investors.
Such recognition, with or without a public relations boost, has
more force than a bland “mistakes-were-made handout” and
acceptance of responsibility with no specific referents. Lacking any
consciousness of opportunity cost, payment devoid of any implicit
reference to indemnification sounds like “cheap talk”—only
slightly less cheap than talk accompanied by no money at all. In
the reparations setting of rights and wrongs, payment ought to
come across as both compensation and fulfillment of a debt. The
money is not laundered, one might say. Victims could accept it
with honor.47
2.3. Honoring Both (and Mediating Between) Security and Freedom
Through Pecuniary Reparations
Reparations planners who have decided to pay monetary
compensation to victims might consider the purposes of transfer
payments that are made as compensation for injury in ordinary
litigation. Following the lead of Ruth Rubio-Marín and Margaret
Walker, who have urged attention to human rights violations,48 I
47 One activist lawyer pursuing human rights claims was irked by his
compatriots’ interest in the rumors of Pinochet’s gold in Hong Kong: “It speaks
badly of us Chileans that we react more strongly when we read a story about
Pinochet and money, Pinochet and dollars, than when it is about Pinochet and
deaths.” Vergara & McDonnell, supra note 40, at A7. Citizens of this very country
who received “dollars” for events of the Pinochet-era nevertheless told
researchers that money did not fulfill their needs for reparation. Roht-Arriaza,
supra note 31, at 180. This apparent inconsistency becomes consistent when one
recognizes that tort law’s preoccupation with money as damages is not merely
pecuniary and nothing more. Money changes hands to achieve fairness. The
Chilean reaction to news of money was indeed also a reaction to news of deaths.
48 Rubio-Marín, Transitional Societies, supra note 13, at 95–96 (advocating
attention to reasons and rationales behind human rights as a way to pursue
gender equity); Margaret Urban Walker, Gender and Violence in Focus: A
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argue here for a commensurate concern with what financial
recompense seeks to accomplish. The ends of tort law are security
and freedom, pursued in balance.
Tort-thinking desires security and freedom for both sides of the
litigation caption. A tort claim by a plaintiff complains of an
invasion that may be seen as a breach of security; but defendants,
for their part, are entitled to shelter from the danger of an arbitrary
official conclusion that they caused injuries for which they now
must pay. For defendants, security takes form in procedural
justice. Tortious conduct impinges on the freedom of persons hurt
by it. At the same time, too much tort liability—condemnation out
of proportion to the magnitude of real injuries and risks—unduly
impinges on freedom of action.
Divergent perspectives on torts share these two priorities even
while unaligned on other questions. For example, “security”
speaks as pertinently to various problems of economic efficiency in
torts as it does to corrective justice’s attention to the nature of the
wrong that a victim suffered;49 human freedom is as integral to the
jurisprudential concept of “fairness” as it is to the prerogative to
engage in profitable activity that occupies the center of “welfare;”50
thus the paired ends of “compensation” and “deterrence” mediate
between security and freedom while honoring them both.51

Background for Gender Justice in Reparations, in THE GENDER OF REPARATIONS:
UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 18,
52 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2009) (noting that what appears to be one trauma can
expand into a multiplicity of injuries).
49 Examples abound. Insecurity as a transaction cost impedes bargaining; the
right to hold property is integral to participation in civil liability system as well as
to one’s status as an economic actor; threats to physical security absent tort
liability would be guarded against by wasteful precautions.
50 Notwithstanding the contention in one widely cited work that fairness and
welfare are opposites. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE (2002).
51 In principle, deterrence can be severed from compensation as long as a
system forces actors to internalize the costs of their activities by some other
means, like fines; but welfare analysts prefer to empower compensation-seeking
victims as enforcers of this obligation, at least in settings like the United States
where these alternative sources of cost internalization are weak. See generally
Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137 (1995) (noting the
need for tort liability, not just administrative regulation, to force cost integration
through deterrence in the context of managing new technologies). See also infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
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Enhancing Security

Although security applies to both sides of the litigation caption,
it functions in a more fundamental way on the plaintiff’s side.
After a procedure that is faithful to the rule of law deems a
defendant responsible for an injury, security in tort law addresses
mainly the safety or settled equilibrium that these defendants have
disturbed. Any national scale repair of this disruption must
consider that a wrongfully inflicted injury is a breach of the peace
whose consequences extend into a victim’s future.
In this reparations context, consider violence that government
agents initiated or condoned, resulting in post-traumatic stress
disorder and related anxieties.
Tort-thinking reminds
policymakers that the repair of this injury cannot succeed without
acknowledging its future effects. Every wrong amenable to legal
redress, not just trauma, projects forward in time. Some of the
protrusion into the future may be juridical rather than inherent in
the wrong itself—that is, they may be kept alive by the preparation
of testimony, the stoking of narration in public venues (such as
truth commissions), or the tendency of adjudication to look
backward—but victims feel its effects all the same. Inflictors of
injury know, or should know, that the wrong they commit will
undermine a victim’s security even after they stop acting.
The reparations programs of several nations have recognized
this unity between past and future by not requiring victims to
recount acute episodes that undermined their security abruptly. A
mother who inferred after some weeks of absence that her son
disappeared, for instance, cannot identify an exact moment that
her injury occurred, but has suffered a breach of her security.
National reparations programs confront a cruel past havoc. This
disarray once threatened even business-like conceptions of
security, such as the “rational” worries about investment that
permeated the economies of Argentina and Chile. Reparations
presume, in short, that the breach of security is still alive, unsettled,
voracious—a blight on the future and the present as well as the
national past.
Applied to ordinary civil justice in developed legal systems,
where prosperous and well-represented defendants litigate by
making arguments and shuffling papers, and where those
“persons” who seek redress need not be human beings, rhetoric
this vivid may sound a bit overheated. But even in the driest
precincts, a quest for monetary compensation in court for non-
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contractual wrongs necessarily involves a violation of security; at
the same time, the resistance that a defendant mounts is a plea to
keep the tranquility of the status quo, casting the plaintiff as a
disruptor. Private-law adjudication sets out to determine in binary
fashion which of the two is the troublemaker, the putative
wrongdoer or the complainant.52 And then, if the plaintiff wins,
the adjudicator fashions a remedy to restore equanimity and civil
peace.53 Part of the work of recompense is to give the victim more
security in the future. Money damages paradigmatically do this
job by allowing victims to collect their awards, put them in the
bank, and sleep better.
2.3.2.

Enhancing Freedom

Perpetrators of wrongdoing obligated under tort law to pay
victims recompense—in contemporary practice, such perpetrators
could be nation-states or business entities, not just individuals—
have overindulged in their own freedom, hurting other people at
least along the way, if not on purpose. Their freedom to swing
their fist, or to not care about the foreseeable consequences of their
inattention, or recklessly to neglect the basic safety of their
citizenry, should have ended before the other person was hurt, but
did not. They felt free to cross a boundary. They were wrong.
“Our autonomy is limited,” writes torts scholar and philosopher
Jules Coleman, “only insofar as we are not free to cross the borders
that define the protective moral spheres of our neighbors.
Boundary crossings are violations, and should harm ensue,
compensation is owed.”54 Whether taking a trivial form, like an
automobile collision that bends fenders, or a deep one, like a
52 See Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 52 (2001) (examining this proposition through “[i]nversions of
aggression” in civil rights litigation).
53 Even in an idealized version of this restoration, nominal winners often fail
to get what they really want. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 617–23 (2006) (noting the difficulty of collecting
judgments). American tort plaintiffs, for instance, often seek medical monitoring
following the exposure to toxic substances, but almost never receive it. Anita
Bernstein, Fellow-Feeling and Gender in the Law of Personal Injury, 17 J. L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming 2009). The focus of law (as contrasted to “equity”) on monetary
damages forecloses creative remedies.
54 Jules L. Coleman, Legal Theory and Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2579, 2615 (1995); see
also Christine Chambers Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for
Evaluating Intoxicated Consent, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 57, 61-62 (2009) (evaluating
“boundary crossing” within the context of intoxicated consent under rape laws).
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massacre, every wrongfully inflicted injury calls out for repair of
what it inflicted on its victim. Too much prerogative on the part of
the wrongdoer—insufficiently checked and inhibited—has violated
the rights of a human being.
Pecuniary recompense for wrongdoing reminds the recipient
that freedom exists not only for the class of assailants who
overindulged but for the individual victim too. Consequently,
after legal proceedings have concluded, the recipient will
ordinarily enjoy more choice than before. If a monetary transfer
succeeds in enhancing security for victims, then that increase in
security will foster the victims’ sense of power over their
environment. Receiving money adds a layer of freedom to this
minimum where the best revenge, so to speak, is not actual
vengeance against perpetrators55 nor withdrawal from civil society,
but a superior exercise of one’s human prerogatives. Victims can
now do what they want in a way that, unlike the actions of the
wrongdoer, does not violate the rights of anyone else.
Again, money makes for a uniquely effective instrument.
Tortfeasors found liable in the legal systems of developed nations
do not turn over a new appliance or a fancier wheelchair to you
after you have established yourself as their victim. They cut you a
check, which allows you to spend your “reparations” as you like.
Measures of compensation that reparations programs might use
should also foster choice, and thus freedom.
3.

MICROFINANCE AS A DEVICE FOR REPARATIONS

Reparations planners willing to consider the medium of
pecuniary compensation face the question of which means of
payment to use. This Section outlines a proposal to convey
payment in the form of shares in a microfinance institution. To
assess and defend the suggestion, this section begins by discussing
“microfinance” in contradistinction to the more familiar term
“microcredit.”
It next explores alternative structures for
microfinance programs, and considers what microfinance has to
offer that simple cash transfer payments do not. Later parts of the
Article build on this discussion by linking microfinance with the
normative ambitions of tort theory and the enhancement of gender
equality.
55 Recall the American declaration that damages are awarded “to vindicate
parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful self-help.” See supra note 23
and accompanying text.
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3.1. Nomenclature: “Microfinance”
Coinage of the neologisms “microcredit” and “microfinance”
added a contemporary gloss to ancient practices because smalltime financial transactions are as old as commerce itself. Lack of
clarity about what “microcredit” means in particular has sown
confusion.56 Today, decades after its entrée into development
discourse in the mid-1970s, “microcredit” might refer to many
kinds of small-time lending and borrowing, including “agricultural
credit, or rural credit, or cooperative credit, or consumer credit,
credit from the savings and loan associations, or from credit
unions, or from money lenders.”57
The younger word
“microfinance” was coined by the German development scholar
Hans Dieter Seibel in 1990.58
3.1.1.

What is the difference between microfinance and
microcredit?

Microcredit is a small amount of money loaned to a client by a
bank or other institution. Microfinance refers to loans, savings,
insurance, transfer services, microcredit loans and other financial
products targeted at low-income clients.59
Respecting the distinction between these two terms, this
Section examines the virtues and limitations of distributing

56 “[T]he word has been imputed to mean everything to everybody,” wrote
Muhammad Yunus, the banking pioneer who went on to Nobel acclaim, “[w]e
really don’t know who is talking about what.” Grameen Bank, What is
Microcredit?, Sept. 2009, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com
_content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=108.
57 Id.
58 Hans Dieter Seibel, Does History Matter? The Old and the New World of
Microfinance in Europe and Asia, Oct. 5, 2005, at 1 (presented at the Asia Research
Institute, National University of Singapore), available at http://www.unikoeln.de/ew-fak/aef/10-2005/2005-10%20The%20Old%20and%20the%20New
%20World%20in %20Europe%20and%20Asia.pdf.
59 See International Year of Microcredit 2005, Why a Year?—About Microfinance
and Microcredit, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/pages/whyayear/whyayear
_aboutmicrofinance.asp (last visited Oct. 26, 2009). The definition reserves “lowincome clients” for microfinance only, leaving open the possibility that highincome clients might partake of microcredit. In common parlance, however, they
do not because high-income borrowers do not need small loans. See also
MicroCapital Institute, The Social Impact of Commercial Microfinance, at 4,
http://microcapital.org/downloads/whitepapers/Social.pdf (last visited Nov. 1,
2009) (noting that loan size “can be used as a proxy for the social aspects of
microfinance”).
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reparations benefits as microfinance, giving beneficiaries new
opportunities for savings and credit rather than loans.60
The appeal to microfinance instruments rather than microcredit
keeps faith with a crucial characteristic of reparations: as complete
or perfect transfers, they come with no obligation to be returned.
Loans, credits, and exhortations to the poor to cultivate their inner
entrepreneur are different from the transfer of wealth. Identified
victims of serious human rights violations hold no responsibility
for earning and paying for their own reparations.61
3.2. Choosing Among Means to Convey Pecuniary Reparations
Through Microfinance
Continuing the theme of going beyond credit to include an
array of financial activities derived from work by development
economist Hans Dieter Seibel and others, would establish
recipients of reparations payments as shareholders in microfinance
institutions. The transfer payments from government to citizenvictims would take the form of shares. For this purpose, a
microfinance institution is an entity that provides financial
services—at least credit and savings, possibly others—to customers
who would normally be considered too poor for a bank to profit
from serving them.62
Microfinance institutions can be, in Seibel’s tripartite scheme,
either “formal,” “semiformal,” or “informal.” The first category of
“formal” institutions includes, or resembles, banking in the
developed world: an institution (typically a bank or finance
company) functions under regulation and supervision by a
governmental authority. “Semiformal” institutions are registered
but not regulated as financial entities. These institutions include
savings and loan cooperatives and nongovernmental organizations

60 This Section sweeps past an extensive, bitter political battle over the two
words. The United Nations “year,” for instance, is of microcredit rather than
microfinance, despite lobbying for “microfinance” by nongovernmental
organizations. Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006,
at 62, 67. For a victory of “microfinance” over “microcredit,” see Stephanie Strom,
What’s Wrong with Profit?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at F1 (noting that the $ 100
million donation of Pierre Omidyar to Tufts University was earmarked for
“developing microfinance”).
61 References to “microcredit” arise occasionally in this Article, however,
because the development literature relied on often uses this term when it intends
the wider menu of “microfinance.”
62 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1–2.
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(“NGOs”) that provide credit.63 “Informal” institutions, including
low-level moneylenders and self-help groups, are neither regulated
nor registered, although their activities may fall within customary
law.64 Governments going the “informal” route would make
reparations payments in the form of shares in existing unregulated,
unregistered local institutions.65
Accountability, transparency, and protection of the rights and
interests of shareholders and those who deal with them command
a preference for formal or semiformal entities as reparations
vehicles, unless only informal institutions are available during the
nation’s transition.
Absent a minimal degree of economic
development and stability, informal institutions could join the plan
with the understanding that their connection to a government
program demands a degree of extra oversight. Engagement with
national reparations would necessarily push the institution
upward toward the semiformal category.
Although this Article cannot provide detailed descriptions of
the financial institutions with which national governments might
build partnerships to effect reparations schemes, planners who
devise reparations have the benefit of decades of development
assessment as a base of relevant experience.
To be sure,
reparations differ greatly from economic development initiatives,
but the two categories of intervention have enough in common to
support some preliminary thoughts about how formal, semiformal,
and informal institutions fit within a reparations scheme.
Generalization in this mode will be refined (or belied, if need be) at
the planning stage by the varied encounters already experienced
by most governments with microfinance.
One common starting place for a reparations program, feasible
in most countries that have started to emerge from crisis and
falling under the “semiformal” category of microfinance
institution, is the credit NGO. A credit NGO typically offers small
loans, often along with other interventions (education, counseling,
health care), to its low-income clientele.66 Capitalized by external
63 The Grameen Bank started out as a credit NGO, funded first by “soft loans
and grants” before becoming more self-sustaining. See Bruck, supra note 60, at 62
(recounting early development of Grameen Bank).
64 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1 n.2.
65 See generally Douglas Snow, Microcredit: An Institutional Development
Opportunity, 1 INT’L J. ECON. DEVELOPMENT 1 (1999) (“Sustainable microcredit
programs must be embedded in the network of existing local institutions.”).
66 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 8–9.
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donor agencies, this entity would have been at work inside the
strife-torn country before the government started to disburse
reparations payments. A reparations program could partner with
a credit NGO in a transitional relationship aimed ultimately at
forming a freestanding financial institution that citizen-recipients
would own collectively.67 The NGO would deliver financial
services to this clientele, along with practical help (like office space
for its operations) on terms of cooperative ownership, until the
membership of shareholders achieves the capacity to govern
itself.68
Working with an existing credit NGO offers this
reparations plan an established connection between funders and
poor people, as well as the flexibility to take on new projects
quickly;69 these advantages might outweigh the difficulties
presented by shared governance.
Reparations planners could alternatively pursue a type of
partnership with a different mix of advantages and disadvantages
for the program. Governments might bypass (or be unable to
engage) credit NGOs and instead link up with informal—
unregulated and unregistered—local institutions that function only
as microfinancers.70 Recipients of reparations would acquire
shares in existing entities that might have been formed as
associations, cooperatives, or foundations. Their governmentdisbursed payments would join capital already held by the
informal institution. Such an arrangement would lack the access to
capital and established routes to reach the poor that a credit NGO
would likely have, but could pay undivided attention to
microfinance and enjoy freedom to veer from the mandate of a
foreign entity.
A third possibility for reparations-through-microfinance is the
formation of a new microfinance institution from the ground up.
67 In Rwanda, for example, a nation that has tried to use microcredit as a
constituent of reparations, an NGO called AVEGA extends microcredit to
genocide widows. See GLOBAL YOUTH CONNECT, RWANDA PROGRAM REPORT (2006),
available at http://www.globalyouthconnect.org/pdf/rwanda_summer2005.pdf
(describing the AVEGA program). An existing relation like this could form the
base of microfinance in contrast to microcredit.
68 See SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 12 (noting
institutional weaknesses in NGO governance). See also Bruck, supra note 60, at 65
(quoting one founder of a credit NGO: “’If you give them a loan and don’t see that
their other needs are met, perhaps they are worse off. They have a debt to repay,
but still they have no sanitation, no health care, no education.’”).
69 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 9.
70 Id. at 12.
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When choosing this approach, the government would make
reparations payments in the form of shares in new institutions.
Experience suggests that planners of this new entity should
strongly consider building a revenue base consisting of more than
government-directed transfer payments: adding the “savings of
other people, no matter how small” would make the institution
more likely to succeed in its community.71 The Arab sanadiq (a
plural noun; singular sanduq) present a model for this approach.
Sanadiq, financed by “a mixture of member-equity and external
equity contributions,”72 have succeeded in Syria73 and offer a
model for future reparations in Iraq.74
In every form that a national reparations program might pick
to convey reparations payments, the microfinance institution
would establish recipients who had suffered violations of their
human rights as owner-decisionmakers, thereby enhancing their
agency in the process of rehabilitation. Victims of abuses would
receive reparations payments in the form of shares in an enterprise
that offers them savings and the prospect of credit. Pooled capital
would become their shared portfolio, amenable to diversification
and oriented toward pecuniary returns for its owners.75
Restrictions on how to trade or otherwise alienate shares in the
microfinance institution would necessarily vary from country to
country in response to existing corporate law and the reparations

Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
73 Markus Buerli & Aden Aw-Hassan, Assessing the Impact of Village Credit and
Savings Associations on the Rural Poor in Low Rainfall Areas in Syria, Deutscher
Tropentag: Rurual Poverty Reduction Through Research for Development, 1 (Oct.
5, 2004), http://www.tropentag.de/2004/abstracts/links/Buerli_fHJgUS4i.pdf.
74 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 18.
75 The government would need to resolve, preferably by transparent means,
the contentious question of how much freedom these shareholders should have to
govern their institution. At present, a consensus in the development literature
advocates the frank pursuit of profit by microfinance institutions: shelter from the
market results in squandered opportunity, in this view. A national government
supportive of this stance would encourage recipients of reparations payments to
become small capitalists. As shareholders of their institutions, they could extend
credit at uncapped interest rates and foreclose on loans no matter how poignant
the defaulting debtors; in general they would live by a free-to-fail market
ideology. This development literature consensus could shift in the future to favor
more regulation and less owner-manager prerogative.
71
72
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goal of maximizing the autonomy, agency, and welfare of
shareholder-recipients.76
3.3. Simple Transfer Payments Contrasted
Although microcredit is an extraordinarily popular tool in the
development kit, even its admirers like to call it “no panacea,”77
and counsel caution in its application. The lexical move from
“microcredit” to the vaguer (and, of course, debt-free, at least
before the institution starts making loans) “microfinance” may ease
some worries, but does not eliminate all controversy in the
recommendation. Scarcity is a precept that unites those who might
otherwise disagree on reparations policy.
Microeconomic
understandings of what choosers gain and lose, the
macroeconomic theories that underlie development intervention,
and national governments making policy decisions would all call
on an advocate of microfinance in reparations to say why this
particular expenditure makes sense as a means to effect a
reparative goal when this choice would necessarily conflict with
other means.
The most straightforward alternative to microfinance is a
simple cash transfer payment.78 Planners would arrange to
76 See infra Section 4.1.2 (linking free trading of shares to community’s ability
to pursue projects based on differing levels of risk tolerance).
77 See, e.g., Tony Allen-Mills, No Panacea for World Poverty—Benefits of MicroLending Called Into Question, THE AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 5, 2009, at 10 (noting modest
gains); Nan Dawkins Scully, Micro-Credit No Panacea for Poor Women, GLOBAL
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.gdrc.org/icm/wind/micro.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2009) (conceding that “[m]icroenterprise development has, in
some circumstances, contributed positively to women’s empowerment”); Lisa
Avery, Microcredit Extension in the Wake of Conflict: Rebuilding the Lives and
Livelihoods of Women and Children Affected by War, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y
205, 228 (2005) (“Microcredit is Not a Panacea”); Yunus, supra note 56
(recommending more clarity in the definition of terms); Celia W. Taylor,
Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. &
COM. 303, 320–35 (2002) (contending that the effects of microcredit on
international law warrant more attention).
78 Another, and to many observers a more attractive, alternative to
microfinance and simple cash transfer payments would be “collective payments,”
or social welfare spending, for the good of the entire public rather than to benefit
individuals identified as victims of wrongdoing. A government might establish
new health clinics, for example, or implement programs that reduce or eliminate
school fees. Such spending would in many cases do more good for the country
than pecuniary reparations for individuals. One would hope that governments
recognize the public good of expenditures on the needs of citizens. This Article
omits study of this alternative, however, in the belief that social welfare spending
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distribute money to recipients. Though attractive in its simplicity,
the cash transfer alternative is inferior to microfinance in several
ways.79
The first advantage of microfinance over cash transfers is a
practical one, as well as a reminder of the central role of security in
reparations.
Functioning as shareholders in a microfinance
institution gives recipients a safe place to store their monetary
property, which includes not only reparations payments but also
their savings.
Given the near certainty that poverty will
accompany a reparations program, planners who seek to make
pecuniary distributions need to address the question of whether a
recipient can safely hold on to the money she receives. Around the
world, poor people—who never own absolutely nothing—suffer
from this lack of basic security. They struggle to find substitutes
for the insured and well-guarded bank accounts that wealthy
people take for granted.80 Savings first, then.
Second, microfinance opens the possibility of expanding credit
to the poor who would otherwise be regarded as ineligible to
borrow money. The government-funded microfinance institution
would go on to lend out portions of its capital, probably offering
small loans to borrowers in its community who would otherwise
have little or no access to credit. By this move, a significant share
of reparations-money transitions through microfinance into
microcredit, and partakes of microcredit’s considerable success.
For reparations purposes, the curative effect of expanded credit
reaches fundamentally into a victim’s well-being. The word
“victim,” the source of her entitlement to become a shareholder,
loses its hold as this citizen moves to bankability. Shakespeare
notwithstanding, any person who may both “a borrower . . . [and]
a lender be”81 is more autonomous, more likely to enjoy both selfis not reparations. Compare de Grieff, supra note 6, at 468–69 (detailing advantage
and disadvantages of treating social welfare spending as reparations) with RubioMarín, supra note 13, Transitional Societies, at 29 (advocating inclusion of social
welfare spending in the reparations category).
79 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 8; Hans Dieter Seibel &
Andrea Armstrong, Reparations and Microfinance Schemes, in HANDBOOK, supra note
2, at 676, 678.
80 “With no safe place to store whatever money they have, the poor bury it,
or buy livestock that may die, or invest in jewellery [sic] that may be stolen and
can be hard to sell.” Tom Easton, The Hidden Wealth of the Poor, ECONOMIST, Nov.
3, 2005, at 3 (Survey of microfinance section).
81 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 1,
sc. 3.
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respect and the respect of others, than a person shut out of both
roles. As they become investors, reconstructors, and rebuilders of
the social tissue, these shareholders gain in relative social status,
and by their work and risk-taking they earn this gain.82
Third, through their investment decisions and eventual
extraction of income from the microfinance institution, recipients
gain routes to the social services that some deem at least as central
to compensation for the human rights violations they experienced
(planners think first of medical clinics, but counseling, adult
education, and vocational and agricultural training are also among
the possibilities). 83 A recipient who gains a cash transfer payment
can obtain social services by spending the transfer on them; a
recipient who obtains shares in a microfinance institution can
obtain social services by turning her shares into cash and by
directing investment into for-profit vehicles that make social
services likely to emerge and flourish faster than they would from
the injection of more money into the local economy—by elevating
per capita income, engaging women as adult civic participants, and
strengthening networks. Microfinance thus comes closer than cash
payments to the social investment alternative expenditure that
some observers would prefer. Indeed, over time microfinance
delivers these other two types of recompense, cash and (for those
recipients who want them) social services.
The fourth point in the roster moves from individuals to
societies: in action, microfinance moves beyond savings and credit
as pursued and deployed by citizens to social effects. Any national
repair following a total crisis requires both sustainable incomegenerating activities and sustainable local entities that can extend
capital to finance them.84 Neither of these two conditions will
endure without the other; both call on citizens to participate in
collective undertakings.
The establishment of microfinance

Thanks to Ruth Rubio-Marín for underscoring this point.
Reparations in Guatemala, for example, emphasize the need for social
supports and direct relatively little funding to what the program calls “economic
indemnification.” Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey, Guatemala: Gender and Reparations for
Human Rights Violations, in WHAT HAPPENED TO THE WOMEN? GENDER AND
REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 92, 110 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2006).
One alderman in Chicago issued a call for slavery reparations in the United States
that would eschew transfer payments in favor of social supports. Fran Spielman,
Slavery Reparations Leaders Rip Bank’s Scholarship Offer, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 23,
2005, at 10.
84 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1.
82
83
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institutions for reparations supports both conditions. New capital
makes sustainable income-generating activities more likely to
occur, and extending shareholder ownership to victims of human
rights abuses engages these individuals in civic repair. Hans
Dieter Seibel has gone further, noting that new loci of economic
power pull wealth away from a government that has been at best
unreliable in the past.
Microfinance “creates alternative
nongovernmental sources of power,” Seibel and Andrea
Armstrong write, and thus “is a potential impediment to future
abuses by the central government.”85 As a means of reparation,
this measure enlists recipients into a common pursuit of
institution-building and the relationships that follow the rise of
stable institutions.
To this four-item list of virtues—safe savings for the poor,
enhancement of agency, expansion of services, and civic repair
through the building of financial institutions—one might add a
fifth pecuniary virtue that builds on the second and third points.
Reparations programs that feature microfinance would capitalize
on extraordinary worldwide enthusiasm for this measure,86 and
An
thus might simply become more likely to happen.87
international donor disinclined to finance a cash-transfer or socialsupports reparations program, on the ground that mending a
nation following crisis is a task for government alone, may hold a
different view of a program patterned in part on longstanding
development initiatives.
Many who laud this form of development have added hard
capital of their own, not just words of praise, to the microfinance
endeavor. In the early 1980s, the then-governor of Arkansas, Bill
Clinton, asked Muhammad Yunus for advice on applying
Grameen Bank’s small-loan methods to alleviate poverty in his
state. Two decades later, this same man structured a Clinton
Global Initiative that placed $30 million in microcredit funds in
NGOs around the world.88 The story of the $27 loan that Dr.
Seibel & Armstrong, Reparations Schemes, supra note 79, at 679.
See Avery, supra note 77, at 224–225 (summarizing the achievements of
microcredit programs); Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, supra note 12
(recognizing the positive impact of microcredit programs conducted by the 2006
Nobel Peace Prize Laureates).
87 It would be irresponsible not to acknowledge, in a work on reparations,
that some reparations plans fail.
88 Clinton Global Initiative, Grameen Foundation USA’s Growth Guarantees
Program, 2005, http://rews.clintonglobalinitiative.org/CGIsite/commitmentnote
85
86
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Yunus made out of his own pocket to Bangladeshi basket weavers
in 1976 has spurred a multibillion-dollar business which includes
some of the world’s largest financial institutions, such as Citibank,
Deutsche Bank, and the Dutch giant ABN AMRO.89 Microcredit
also appeals to big businesses beyond big banks: As one
industrialist remarked at a microcredit summit, success in
microlending would mean new prospective customers for his own
company.90
As this Article goes to press, “microcredit” as a buzzword still
enjoys continuing popularity with numerous and varied sources of
development funding.91 No jargon will stay eternally in fashion.
By any name, however, microcredit presents a macro-prescription:
the fostering of gainful economic activity through small loans for
which lenders expect and enforce repayment. As such, it will
continue to appeal to sources of capital located outside the
boundaries of the nation that builds a reparations scheme.92 This

.asp?ID=218024 (last visited Sept. 24, 2009). Other American politicians admire
microcredit, too. Introduced in the United States Senate, the Women and
Children in Conflict Protection Act of 2003 sought to extend microcredit to
society’s most vulnerable classes, including refugees and internally displaced
persons. See Women and Children in Conflict Protection Act of 2003, S. 1001,
108th Cong. § 306(e) (2003) (detailing microfinance grants to specific persons and
institutions). Aiming to implement sustainable programs equipped to address
acute humanitarian needs, this bill includes provisions for microcredit as a source
of enhanced economic security for women as household providers. Id. § 306(a)–
(d).
89 Alison Benjamin, Dollar a Week Bank is Still a Success, GUARDIAN WEEKLY,
Jun. 19, 2009, at 44 (reporting expansion of Grameen programs into New York, via
Citibank); Mark Sappenfield & Mark Trumbull, Big Banks Find Little Loans a Nobel
Winner, Too, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 16, 2006, World, at 1, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1016/p01s03-wogi.html
(describing
the
business appeal of microfinance programs).
90 Hugh Grant, Chief Operating Officer, Monsanto Co., Remarks at the
Microcredit Summit +5 (Mar. 2003) (transcript available in Microcredit Summit ENews, http://www.microcreditsummit.org/enews/2003-03_sp_grant.html.
91 See, e.g., Sara Corbett, Can the Cellphone Help End Global Poverty?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, (Magazine), at 34 (explaining the role of microfinance in
developing village phone-sharing initiatives); Cheryl Hall, Big D Givers Embrace
Micro-Loans Programs, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 26, 2008, Business, at 1D
(addressing Grameen affiliate initiatives that support local Texan businesses like
beauty parlors and auto repair shops); Jim Simon, In Kenya, Ambitions for
Microfinance Grow, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2009, at 27.
92 For a more cynical expression of this point, see Walden Bello, Microcredit,
Macro Issues, NATION, Oct. 14, 2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc
/20061030/bello (arguing “establishment circles” support microcredit programs
largely because they present a market-based economic strategy without the
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sector of foreign supporters reliably prefers entrepreneurship to
mere “handout[s],”93 or what Seibel has called “one-off
payments.”94 Another virtue that might remain central—long after
the Year of Microcredit has ended—is that while this technique
flatters neoliberalism and the politicians who promote markets in
the West, microcredit can also be practiced in harmony with
Islam.95 Partnerships between national reparations-throughmicrofinance plans and foreign sources of capital could thus arise
in Muslim contexts with relatively little worry about potential
backlash—an unusual advantage for a device that gets praised
both as feminist96 and for offering a secular alternative in the
Muslim nation of Bangladesh.97

serious side effects that have arisen from alternative market-based plans, such as
the World Bank’s infamous structural adjustment policies).
93 On the contrast between the two, see Can Technology Eliminate Poverty?,
BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Dec. 26, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine
/content/05_52/b3965025.htm (“I get very upset when people say [the poorest]
people don’t have the entrepreneurial ability, initiative, and skills to use loans, so
they need some other kind of intervention like subsidy, handout, or charity.”
(quoting Muhammad Yunus) (alteration in original)); Evelyn Iritani, Tiny Loans
Seen as Big Way to Invest in Developing Nations’ Poor, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at C1
(reporting strong entrepreneurial interest in microcredit particularly because of its
“hand-up, not a handout” approach to poverty); Corbett, supra note 91, at 34
(describing a Grameen initiative that uses microcredit to facilitate rural access to
cell phones through local entrepreneurs).
94 SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1 (noting that, in
contrast to microfinance, the benefits of such payments “tend to be short-lived
and unsustainable”).
95 Zofeen Ebrahim, Pakistan: Islamic Banking is Microcredit Too, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Feb. 5, 2006, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=32041 (reporting that
one microcredit lender in Pakistan espouses the religious tenet of Qarze-e-Hasna,
or “helping someone in need with interest-free loans, which are preferred over
charity”). The question of interest on the loans would play a part in Muslim
opinions of microcredit schemes, but poses no insurmountable hurdle. After all,
enterprises currently transact financial business in the Muslim world while
respecting its disapproval of interest. Jerry Useem, Banking on Allah, FORTUNE,
June 10, 2002, at 154, 156 (describing Islamic approaches to financial transactions,
including murabaha, a method that resembles interest, and darura, the excuse of
“overriding necessity”).
96 See Press
Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, supra note 12
(acknowledging the empowering role of microcredit for women).
97 See Celia W. Dugger, Peace Prize to Pioneer of Loans for Those Too Poor to
Borrow, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, at A6 (“In the overwhelmingly Muslim nation of
Bangladesh, Mr. Yunus’s approach also offered hope and ideas to compete with
the allure of fundamentalist Islamic causes. ‘It’s a very secular movement,’
Professor [Amartya] Sen said, ‘very egalitarian, market friendly and socially
radical.’”).
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Microcredit has offered much to many: one magazine
characterized the gains as “Millions for Millions.”98 It need not
deliver on everyone’s ambitious dream to help a reparations plan.
Popularity itself is a useful virtue, and reparations programmers
who avail themselves of microfinance would be connected to
sources of powerful external support.
4.

THE ALIGNMENT OF MICROFINANCE WITH REPARATIONS AS
INFORMED BY TORT THEORY

A program that disburses pecuniary reparations in the form of
shares in microfinance institutions would augment the security
and freedom of citizen recipients and thus, as elaborated in the
previous Part, align with aspirations central to tort law. Equally
important, microfinance as a mode of pecuniary reparations
strengthens the promise of tort law as a means to effect justice for
individuals. Simple cash transfer payments to individuals comport
with the ambitions of tort law, but microfinance does so with more
force.
4.1. Augmenting Security and Freedom
4.1.1.

Microfinance and security

In prosperous nations, tort remedies presume that judgments
yield money and that successful plaintiffs will receive these funds
in a form they can save or spend as they choose. Spenders get the
benefit of what they buy; savers get the comfort of knowing they
can spend later. This belief is not especially accurate, even when
one puts aside the fact that even in the United States, a country
perceived as litigious, most victims of tortious conduct do not sue
and most lawsuits are resolved by means other than a judgment.99
In nations suited to considering reparations schemes, the
presumption grows more inaccurate still. The poor—and a large
Bruck, supra note 60.
See Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
443, 448–52 (1987) (noting studies that indicate a low incidence of tort claims
arising out of injuries in the United States); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 459, 515–16 (2004) (documenting high settlement rate as one of many
mechanisms for dispute resolution obviating the need for trial resolution); Gilles,
supra note 53, at 617–23 (reporting high proportion of potential defendants who
are judgment-proof).
98
99
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number of reparations recipients will be poor—often cannot save,
and not because they need to consume all their income for
survival. As was mentioned, bank accounts remain out of reach
for many poor people around the world, who must resort to
dangerous methods of holding their savings: burial (as in under a
mattress, or in the ground); jewelry that is vulnerable to theft and
usually cannot be sold quickly for its full value; and animals that
die, get sick, get stolen, and wander away.100
When governments disburse money, other threats to security
arise even for recipients who have a safe place to store it. The
trauma to the nation that preceded the reparations program
compels planners to anticipate threats to safety in the disbursement
of payments. Conflict-torn regions are littered with armaments
like guns and grenades; demobilized soldiers who know how to
use these weapons are often present as well.101 Microfinance
institutions struggle with this danger on the ground.
As a response to this problem, one report offers microfinance
institutions practical advice toward advancing security. It seeks
mainly to prevent armed robberies, which threaten institutions and
their human constituencies.102 Tipsheet pointers (e.g., “[n]either
staff nor clients should wear uniforms or organizational T-shirts or
outfits which may identify who might be carrying money”)103 do
not of themselves build a “failsafe” institution.104 But a local
microfinance entity might nevertheless be the safest place for a
recipient to store the money she receives, and microfinance has
great potential to increase security even for those who do not
participate as shareholders. When a microfinance institution is the
only bank-like entity within reach and can offer a modicum of
security to its customers, the money the recipients deposit there
will generally be safer from loss than money they keep at home.
When a local microfinance institution exists near a commercial
bank, this institution can offer recipients security-enhancing
benefits that the nearby commercial bank may not be able to give

Easton, supra note 80.
See KENNETH GRABER, MICROENTERPRISES BEST PRACTICES, SECURITY ISSUES
FOR MICROFINANCE FOLLOWING CONFLICT 1–2 (2001), http://www.gdrc.org/icm
/disasters/Following_Conflict_Brief_6f.pdf (describing the unique dangers posed
by the lingering effects of combat in post-conflict societies).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 3.
104 Id. at 5.
100
101
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them. For example, a recipient might be too small an accountholder to have access to a commercial account, but holding
reparations-based shares in a microfinance institution could
convey to her this additional security whenever microfinance
institutions band together, offering low-tech shelter to members in
their dealings with the nearby commercial bank. A group of
otherwise vulnerable recipients could travel together when
carrying money, receive checks rather than cash from the
commercial bank, and have space to welcome representatives of
the commercial bank who come to meetings bearing cash.105
By bringing together enterprise-minded individuals with cash
on their hands, microfinance settings also offer a venue for creative
thinking on how to store money safely and enhance the safety of
familiar settings.106 They provide a locus from which to initiate or
expand the furnishing of insurance, a commodity that poor people
around the world desperately want. Researchers find strong
demand for insurance in the developing world, particularly against
drought, harm to livestock, and funeral or burial expenses.107
Entities supported by government reparations payments would
have the capital to meet some of this demand. Engaging
microfinance institutions would thus add force to the security that
tort principles seek to extend.
Id. at 4–5.
For example, in 1984 the Association of Rickshaw Pullers of Zaire worked
out a scheme to deposit part of a day’s receipts with a respected elder. When the
elder is a woman, the record of deposit is called a mamma-card; a deposit with a
male elder is a papa-card. Before the onset of this system, the rickshaw pullers
had no safe place to store their income. Ass’n of Rickshaw Pullers of Zaire, PapaCard or Mamma-Card: Innovative Way for Credit, http://www.gdrc.org/icm
/inspire/papa-mamma.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). In West Africa, mobile
bankers called susu in Ghana and esusu in Nigeria have evolved to allow poor
people to maintain savings accounts. These savers have to pay a small fee every
month to do so, rather than collect interest; they favor the arrangement because it
keeps their money safe and establishes a relationship with a banker who might be
available later to make a small loan. WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT:
THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND VOICE 173 (2001).
107 Stefan Dercon, a professor of development economics at Oxford, has
explored the issue in several contexts. See, e.g., Stefan Dercon, Insurance Against
Poverty Overview, Jan. 2003, at 2, http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members
/stefan.dercon/overview%20document%20insurance%20against%20poverty
_new.pdf (arguing poor people are “least able to cope with risk and shocks, and
therefore would benefit most from protection”); Stefan Dercon et al., Group-Based
Funeral Insurance in Ethiopia and Tanzania 5–6 (Ctr. for the Study of African
Economies, Working Paper No. 227, 2004), available at http://www.bepress.com
/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=csae (finding funeral associations
may be useful model for “other developmental activities”).
105
106
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Microfinance and Freedom

Giving recipients money in the form of shares in a microfinance
institution enhances their freedom as owners, entrepreneurs, and
policymakers. Under the reparations scheme advocated here,
these individuals would receive not only money from their
government but, later on, applications from persons in their
community seeking to borrow some of this capital from the
institution. Thus money quickly conveys to victims of human
rights abuses a modicum of power over their future. They would
have a legislative-like say in appropriations that affect human
lives. They might ask, “Do we want a well, an electric plant, a
feedlot, an expanded transport?” In the answer they express, they
would establish themselves as builders of a sustainable order.
One American donor who had managed a mutual fund before
devoting her time to microfinance projects reported raptly on her
observation of microfinance in Vietnam as an expander of freedom:
Does everyone succeed? No. But it is the same in the
investment business. You don’t want to take a lot of risk?
Buy some ducks. But the more risk-taking borrowers will
pool their loans and buy a baby water buffalo and rent it to
men for farming. And then there are those who blow right
past livestock and build a brick factory.108
4.1.3.

Justice for Individuals

A microfinance scheme rather than a simple transfer payments
scheme addresses the concern that many observers and recipients
of pecuniary reparations have expressed about the limits of cash as
redress for injury. Recall that victims of human rights abuses feel
ambivalent about monetary payments known to some of them as
“blood money.”109 If Tom Tyler and Hulda Thorisdottir are correct
to say that for victim-recipients money is never enough, and leaves
them hungry for a sense of “moral accountability,”110 then
microfinance is a uniquely strong form of pecuniary reparation.

108
109
110

Bruck, supra note 60, at 64.
de Greiff, supra note 6, at 461; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 24.
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In addition to the greater force of increasing agency during the
process of reparations,111 microfinance adds strength through its
preoccupation with accountability and honest books. A cash
transfer appropriates a large sum of money and divides it into
handouts or “one-off payments.”112 For recipients, this payment
may bear an air of “Here you are, happy now? For God’s sake, no
revolution, please.”
Endowing recipients with shares in a
microfinance institution, by contrast, emphasizes the government’s
commitment, permanence, and seriousness of purpose. Under
ordinary conditions of liquidity within the microfinance institution
chosen for the plan, a recipient might be able to turn her
distribution into one-off payment money and nothing more, but
she would have to work to get that result.113 The default setting
would establish her as a shareholder in an ongoing enterprise. In
her role as owner-manager, a person playing some role in the
review of loan applications, she would necessarily think about
repayment in terms of justice and rectification.
A microfinance scheme for distribution also strengthens the
possibility that the government would use subrogation in the
seizure of wrongdoers’ assets.114 In order to choose microfinance
over the simpler transfer payments scheme, the government would
have to commit itself to a more detailed set of books. It would
know not only who was receiving payments but where those
payments were going, at least at their first point of transfer.
Thereafter, the regulations affecting the functions of the
microfinance institution would provide further monitoring of these
funds.115 This level of regulatory detail might convince overseas
banks holding wrongdoers’ assets that the nation emerging from
chaos can be trusted to control the monies they would turn over.
This confidence in the future would encourage such a turnover,
111 See supra Section 3.3 (discussing advantages of microfinance over simple
cash transfers).
112 Seibel, supra note 9, at 1; see also supra note 94 and accompanying text.
113 See infra text accompanying notes 136–38 (discussing the cultural and legal
obstacles encountered by women in maintaining property in their own name).
114 See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing vicarious liability in the
context of proposed unit within national government that would seek
indemnification from wrongdoers).
115 See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (noting the microfinance
institution that would receive payments might be a formal institution, meaning a
regulated entity, or a semiformal institution, meaning a registered entity whose
existence is known to the government; even institutions in the “informal”
category might be upgraded later).
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and next this transformation of ill gained wealth into lawfully held
funds would help to satisfy recipients that what they receive
consists of shares in an endeavor to link money with justice rather
than injustice.
5.

MICROFINANCE PAYMENTS AS SOURCES OF GENDER FAIRNESS
AND WELFARE

According to the many admirers of microfinance, this
innovation, particularly it’s variant of “microcredit,” permits
women to flourish. The citation for the Nobel Prize awarded to
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank mentioned women’s
liberation as one of the effects of microcredit.116 Conventional
wisdom holds that women who receive microloans work hard,
repay debts faithfully, encourage fellow borrowers to comply with
loan terms, and, perhaps, manifest ideals of community and teamplayer solidarity from which a male-dominated model of
commercial banking could learn.117
In response, critics have called microcredit a false cure for
female poverty and powerlessness.118 As United Nations Secretary

116 See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel Committee, supra note 12 and
accompanying text (“Micro-credit has proved to be an important liberating force
in societies where women in particular have to struggle against repressive social
and economic conditions.”).
117 See Avery, supra note 77, at 221–22 (explaining group-based lending
encourages compliance with loan terms through peer pressure of maintaining
good credit for the group); Fundacíon Adelante, What We Do: Our Loan Program,
http://www.adelantefoundation.org/loan_program.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2009) (attributing a better than 95% repayment rate to “character-based lending”
to poor female borrowers in Honduras, in contrast to traditional “collateral-based
lending”).
118 Drake
Bennett, Small Change, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2009,
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/09/20/small_change
_does_microlending_actually_fight_poverty/ (“And while microcredit champions
point to microloans as a tool for empowering women, the studies see no impact
on gender roles, and find evidence that if any one group benefits more, it’s male
entrepreneurs with existing businesses.”); Barbara Crossette, Experts Question
Wisdom of Micro-Credit for Women, WOMEN’S E-NEWS, Mar. 2, 2003,
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1284; Anne Marie Goetz &
Rina Sen Gupta, Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and Control Over Loan Use in
Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh, 24 WORLD DEV. 45, 47 (1996) (noting that male
relatives control much of the loaned capital that women are obliged to repay);
Gina Neff, Microcredit, Microresults, 74 LEFT BUS. OBSERVER 1, 4–5 (Oct. 1996),
available at http://www.leftbusinessobserver.com/Micro.html (criticizing Yunus
and the Grameen bank for failing to lift most borrowers out of poverty and
arguing that entrepreneurship rhetoric diverts women from wage labor that
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General Kofi Annan put this objection in a 1999 report to the
General Assembly, it is “lack of access to land,” rather than a lack
of loans, that presents the most critical single cause of rural
poverty.”119 On the Grameen fix, the Annan report expressed
skepticism, stating “a certain sense of proportion regarding microcredit would seem to be in order.”120 This critique prompts a
useful reminder of the difference between “microcredit” and
“microfinance” for reparations purposes: the microfinance scheme
advocated here does not create the burden of new debt because it
regards reparations payments as conveyed outright, rather than
loaned to recipients. Thus, even if critics are correct to worry about
the imposition of loan repayment obligations on women who may
not be able to control the money they borrow, that concern does
not pertain to the reparations plan advocated here.
This reservation noted, microfinance and what one World Bank
report calls gender equality—a term defined there to include
“equality under the law, equality of opportunity (including
equality of rewards for work and equality in access to human
capital and other productive resources that enable opportunity),
and equality of voice (the ability to influence and contribute to the
development process)”121—have common elements. Both have to
do, at least in part, with the distribution of material goods.122 Both
are secular phenomena. Both are at least consistent with, if not
committed to, the seizure of new opportunity by historically
oppressed persons. As practiced around the world, microfinance
puts money in the hands of women, an outcome that advocates of
gender equality pursue.
To add tort theory to the mix of gender and microfinance,
consider the quest for security and freedom that underlies tort
actions as prosecuted in the courts. Tort principles emerge with
reference to the purposes and functions of civil liability as policy.
Its doctrine compels wrongdoers to pay damages to their victims
would pay better, and also restricts women borrowers to low-yield work that men
do not want to do).
119 Crossette, supra note 118.
120 Id.
121 WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN
RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND VOICE 2–3, (2001), available at http://www-wds
.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/03/01
/000094946_01020805393496/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
122 Some strands of “feminism” do not share this inclination: “gender
equality,” by contrast, cannot escape the material world.
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not only to enhance the freedom and security of individuals in the
correct balance but also, at a societal and conceptual plane, to
achieve results. Welfare and fairness are its two chief desiderata.
Fairness (associated with corrective justice) looks backward, to
redress injury attributed to wrongdoing. From this perspective,
leaving the injury without a remedy is wrong. Some observers of
tort law regard fairness as central; others deem it peripheral and
subordinate to its rival, welfare. Reparations through microfinance
comports with both fairness and welfare.
5.1. Reparations Through Microfinance as a Source of Fairness for
Women
5.1.1.

Ameliorating the Additional Injustice of Having Been
Deprived of a Fair Measure of Control Over Money

The endeavor of planning reparations for recent human rights
violations coexists with a less vivid, but older and more deeply
rooted, wrong: throughout human history, and continuing to this
moment, women in the aggregate have not enjoyed equality with
men with respect to the possession of and control over wealth.
Laws and norms have taken money out of their hands as if women
were moral children and money something too dangerous for them
to hold. A generation ago, the United Nations made a famed
announcement on point: “Women do two-thirds of the world’s
work [as measured in hours], earn one-tenth of the world’s income,
and own less than one-hundredth of the world’s property.”123
Although the United Nations has not updated this notorious
statistic about the world, local studies have continued to find that
disparities remain. For example, the United Nations Millennium
Task Force reported in 2005 that women produce up to 80% of the
household food in Africa and the Caribbean,124 and that women in
Zambia devote an extraordinary 800 hours a year to gathering food
and firewood.125 Ownership of land—a time-honored means for
individuals to accrete economic strength—is less available to
women than men, particularly in developing countries. The World
123 CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES 21 (2006) (citing UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF THE
WORLD’S WOMEN (1979)).
124 U.N. Millennium Project, Task Force on Educ. and Gender Inequality,
Taking Action: Achieving Gender Equality and Empowering Women 77 (2005).
125 Id. at 7–8.
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Bank reports that many national laws still place women under the
guardianship of husbands and recognize “no independent right to
manage property.”126 Several African countries deny married
women the right to own land127 and take land ownership away
from women who become widowed or divorced.128 Studies of
cultivated-land ownership in Asia and Latin America as well as
Africa show that women possess smaller parcels, inferior land, and
less farming equipment than what men possess.129
These conditions—more toil, less income, and much less
property for women—persist and appear more benevolent than
they are with the help of ideology. Patriarchy posits a male
provider who heads his household and meets the needs of the
women and children inside. It further asserts that the women
inside are better off than they would be under conditions of gender
parity.130 The male-headed household protects women from their
various infirmities regarding money and property. Women, it has
been said around the world, are too naive to manage money, too
swayed by emotion to retain it, too busy with child-making and
child-minding to have time for it, too petty-minded to leverage it,
or too pure to want it. A dire pattern in many parts of the world,
WORLD BANK, supra note 121, at 37.
Id. (including Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland).
128 Id. at 51.
129 Id. at 51–52; see also, id. at 120–21 (reporting that much land reform of the
1990s in Latin American and Africa has failed to alleviate these conditions).
130 One expression of this ideology argues that it benefits women:
126
127

The women of every society save our own have understood that the
male’s nature is such that he must be given a special position in the
family if he is to peacefully take his place in it . . . . Women have realized
that men will not even attempt to suppress [their socially disruptive]
tendencies if they are offered no distinctive and respected position in the
family, a position that can act as counterpoise to both the limits marriage
sets on male behavior and the centrality that the woman’s unique
physiological and psychological bond to the infant automatically gives
her. . . .
In response to the refusal to grant them their traditional role men will
tend to either a) disrupt the family as they attain through aggression that
which they were once granted, or b) channel their energies into sexual
conquest outside the family. Women will find that they are raising their
children either on a battlefield or alone, wondering why loudmouthed
Rambos have replaced strong, silent defenders of justice and protectors
of women.
Steven Goldberg, Can Women Beat Men at Their Own Game?, NAT’L REV., Dec. 27,
1993, at 30.
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unequal educational opportunities for girls and young women is
both a symptom and cause of these beliefs.
Payments in the form of shares in a microfinance institution
serve to repair this unfairness more effectively than other forms of
pecuniary reparations. Regardless of the level of formality of the
microfinance,131 these shares can work to rectify historical genderinjustice. Formal institutions offer women recipients access to
technology, and services that had been closed off to most of them
in the past. The category of semi-formal institutions available for
reparations
through
microfinance
is
dominated
by
nongovernmental organizations, which can offer female recipients
a range of support as well as a place to hold their reparations
shares. Informal institutions can advance women’s interests by
honoring compatible local traditions and promoting ideals of selfhelp.132
The simultaneous creation of both a savings account and a
modicum of power over the economic lives of other people
bestows property on women whose value exceeds the sum
transferred. Shares in microfinance institutions give all women
recipients at least de-facto savings accounts (which might
previously have been out of their reach), and for some fraction of
recipients creates real opportunities to govern the institution.
Because virtually every microfinance institution makes loans, these
women shareholders have a voice in capital investment decisions
affecting their communities. A reparations payment with the name
of a woman on it links these small savings accounts and shares in a
business with the rectification of injustice. If microfinance can
generate even a portion of the wealth that its admirers believe it
can create, then a reparations scheme that transfers shares of a
microfinance institution to women as recipients and owners will
improve dramatically the statistic that half the world’s population
owns less than a hundredth of its property.
Shares in a microfinance institution thus help women take a
stand against both the injustice of human rights violations and the
unjust effects of patriarchy within a national economy. Patriarchy
had instructed women to renounce any desire for overt power in
hopes of gaining security in return. Microfinance teaches just the
opposite: that the security one receives from holding money takes
See SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 4 (sketching three
levels of formality).
132 Id. at 14–16 (describing informal microfinance institutions).
131
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form not in a wall or barrier from public life but in decisions,
choices, and investment. Shareholders affect their own wishes and
respond to the material consequences of what they express.
Whether they participate in microfinance while unable to forget the
human rights violations for which they received monetary
compensation, or, at the other extreme, feel determined never to
think about their past and only look forward as investors, they
reclaim what was theirs all along, the sense of recognition and
agency.
In standing up against both acute crises and quotidian
patriarchy, this measure of reparation emphasizes what the two
evils have in common. The stated transformation of wrongdoing
and suffering into shares for holders who may have had no prior
experience with financial instruments reminds participants and
observers of the connection between, on one hand, the episode of
oppression that gave rise to a reparations scheme, and on the other,
the duller background condition of women disabled from full
rights to own property. To name these two wrongs in the same
sentence is not to equate them. The first is not only more vivid but
worse. However, linking a historical antecedent with a facet of
everyday life does not deny any portion of the horror inherent in a
particular national crisis.
On the contrary, catastrophes become both more intense and
more poignant when one becomes aware of an infrastructure that
amplifies their harm. To put the point more optimistically, a
reparative project that enables women to hold and spend their own
money installs an architecture that can help achieve other repairs,
should a subsequent crisis ensue. An architecture that puts money
in all its facets—saving, spending, diverting, withholding,
encouraging, investing—in the hands of women also makes civil
society stronger.
5.1.2.

Fairness Through Shareholding Rather than the Receipt of
Quick Cash

As we have seen, one reason policymakers choose shares in
microfinance institutions as the means of effecting pecuniary
reparations is to augment “security,” in the sense of allowing a
recipient to keep her payment safely rather than have to hide it in
her home or convert it into none-too-safe chattels that could be
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destroyed or taken from her.133 Reparations through microfinance
offers security in other senses, including the prospect of leveraging
one’s payment into additional income that can buy more shelter
from various dangers—cleaner food and water, safer housing,
respite from exhausting or dangerous labor—and the fostering of
sustainable income-generating activities.134 There remains for brief
treatment here one more crucial security theme, present in any
plan for pecuniary reparations: the danger that (male) relatives or
intimate partners could seize money nominally distributed to
(female) recipients.
Layers of complication challenge the delivery of security—and
freedom-enhancing increments to women through any pecuniary
reparations program, not just the microfinance variant advocated
here. Some recipients might, in particular, wish to share or
relinquish what they receive, and believe they enjoy more freedom
or more security as a consequence. A wife may know that her
husband had his eye on a bicycle or a truck, from which purchase
she would also gain some attenuated benefit. If he had been idle
and depressed, she might believe he would feel heartened, and
thus become easier to live with, by the boost of money in his
pocket. A handout to a man from a woman might also ameliorate
difficulties inside the home when a man impinges on his family’s
security by making threats to leave, to become violent, or to take
up dangerous work for the sake of earning income.
Should these examples sound drearily anti-male, amiable men
will serve the point almost as well. A good man may too have
suffered in the old days and been treating his woman kindly
during hard times; might our recipient not want to share her
money with him? A recipient of reparations money might feel
indebted to her man for shelter and other boons from intimate
partners.
Or consider children. Some, if not most, women who receive
reparations money would, without hesitation, try to share it with
the next generation. Notwithstanding de Greiff’s warning that
“the responsibilities of a program of reparation are not the same as
that of a development or social investment plan,”135 mothers would

See Easton, supra note 80, at 3 and accompanying text.
See SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 1, 6–9 and
accompanying text.
135 de Greiff, supra note 6, at 451, 471.
133
134
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certainly spend part of their reparations funds on education, health
care, and food for their young.
Overriding such choices by women, or making them difficult to
effect, could undermine the ambitions of compensation. The large
feminist literature on choice and agency cautions against accusing
women of “false consciousness” for manifesting decisions that
appear self-negating,136 but offers little guidance on how to make
reparations money stay with the women who receive it. Here,
thinking about security and freedom becomes helpful after the fact
as a way to understand what might otherwise look like
squandering. The point of the endeavor had been to enhance the
security and freedom of recipients. Recipients’ diverting their
money to men and children might have been consistent with this
goal.
That said, however, it would be a facile error to condone any
and every distribution of reparations payments as always (with the
help of tautology) enhancing the security and freedom of their
female recipients. Reparations programs owe to recipients not
only the rendering of a designated payment, but also the
safeguards that protect it from both intentional and unintended
disappearance.
Like commercial creditors, investors, and
mortgagees, women recipients of reparations are entitled to enjoy
whatever the rule of law can provide to safeguard their property.
Accordingly, a program’s design must anticipate foreseeable
obstacles to delivery and receipt of the transfer of wealth.
When recipients are women, one key obstacle worthy of
attention is the belief that women should not have the power to
spend money on their own, or for themselves. One can envision
women who simply do not feel entitled to make spending
decisions that enrich themselves directly until they know that their
families’ needs have been satisfied first. A reparations planner
probably cannot thwart such an inclination, but each payment
should have a chance to get to each individual woman first, rather
than to her men or dependent children. Shares in an institution
136 See, e.g. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist
Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 324–50 (1995); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist
Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1139–40
(1993); see also Kerri Lynn Stone, Consenting Adults?: Why Women Who Submit to
Supervisory Sexual Harassment Are Faring Better in Court Than Those Who Say No . . .
and Why They Shouldn’t, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 25, 25 (2008) (describing
ambiguous views of female agency in sexual harassment case law and
commentary).
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achieve this result better than any other rendering of money.
These shares have women’s names on them. They implicitly
contain protection against theft and loss. They state plainly that
recipients include individual women (or men), and are not paid
only to households, families, or communities.
These specifics might provoke an objection, familiar from the
gender controversies surrounding microcredit in the Grameen
mode, that recognizing women as individuals with competence in
worldly realms and who hold personal identities separate from
household and tribe offends the cultural norms of a particular
country, and thus that such a reparations scheme would be
unsustainable in that venue.
This objection should be seen either as mere vapor that rises
from what activist Sara Hlupekile Longwe has called “the
patriarchal cooking pot”137 and rejected, or else taken seriously and
heeded. In other words, perhaps there really are places where
cultural predilection and commercial backwardness intersect to
destroy basic safeguards that would otherwise protect property
transferred to women. Where the claim of absent safeguards is
credible, program designers should, in the name of fairness,
reconsider their plan of paying recompense to individuals. A
society that cannot foster women holding property in their own
name—one treats women only as the means, never the end, of a
program that affects national repair—is one whose reparations
scheme ought to be confined to non-pecuniary measures. Insisting
on naming women as payees would promote strife in such a
setting. Cash changing hands under the contrary approach, one
that defers to patriarchy rather than resists it, would reach the
wrong people and go to waste.
As the experience of microcredit around the world
demonstrates, however, some women even in backward economic
settings have held their property successfully.138 The limited
successes of microcredit would be enhanced by shareholding in
contrast to the receipt of quick cash, which non-recipients could
grab and squander. Shares in a financial institution, in sum, can
offer the best prospects for fairness in the delivery of pecuniary
reparations.
137 Sara Hlupekile Longwe, The Evaporation of Gender Policies in the Patriarchal
Cooking Pot, 7 DEV. PRAC. 148, 148 (1997).
138 On the disputes surrounding this point, see supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
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Reparations Through Microfinance as a Source of GenderEgalitarian Welfare

In contrast to the fairness perspective, welfare analysis looks
forward, striving to increase wealth for persons in the aggregate. It
seeks incentives. In the context of personal injury law, the welfare
perspective encourages legal systems to force inflictors of injury to
pay for the injuries they cause when the internalization of these
costs of harm-causing activities would enhance social wealth.139
Recognizing that human activity produces prosperity along with
losses, welfare analysis seeks to foster optimal rather than
unbounded investments in safety. Thus, it requires those who
inflict injury to pay only for not having taken cost-justified
measures, rather than every possible measure, to avoid causing
injury.140
Welfare analysis of injury law may appear to deviate slightly
from the scope of this Article. First, it is normally used to study
accidental harm, not the intentional or reckless injuries that
reparations programs address. Second, in principle, welfare
analysis does not pursue the compensation of victims, but rather
the imposition of monetary sanctions. As long as the injurer pays,
and as long as potential injurers as a group have to take into
account their obligations to pay should they injure someone, it
matters little to welfare analysis whether any injured person
collects anything. However, these deviations do not limit the value
of the exercise.
Nothing in welfare analysis precludes its
application to intentionally or recklessly inflicted harms,141 and
efficiency-minded scholars have recognized that because fines and
other public sanctions are typically under-used and too cheap:
empowering the victim as recipient can help to ensure that
wrongdoers pay at the optimal level.142
139 See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5–46
(1987) (discussing deterrence and the maximization of welfare).
140 In other words, if a precaution would have cost more money than it
would have saved, the inflictor should not have to pay for the resultant loss. This
possibility lies outside the scope of this Article.
141 Indeed, one prominent practitioner, Richard Posner, applied this analysis
to rape. See Richard A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 384–85 (1992) (discussing the
tension between moral intuition and the rational model’s allowance of rape so
long as the rapist receives more pleasure from the action than inflicts pain on the
victim).
142 Writings on this point from the law and economics camp include Jennifer
H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1114
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Variables will complicate their assessment of a reparations
program, but in general, the awarding of monetary reparations to
individual victims in the form of microfinance will make sense to
welfare analysts. Even though reparations planners may feel
confident that the nation has turned a corner and thus that traumas
to citizens will not recur, a project of reparation does not supersede
the quest of deterrence through incentives. Even though many
individual wrongdoers would then be out of power (or, better yet,
dead), awarding money to victims from the government deemed
responsible teaches prospective wrongdoers about this particular
punch contained in a new rule of law. Among the different ways
to distribute pecuniary reparations, microfinance in the post-crisis
context is particularly attractive to welfare analysts because of the
connection between microfinance and sustainable economic
development.143
With the welfare effects of a reparations-through-microfinance
scheme noted, government planners can pay heed to the
distributive effects of this reparations policy. Enter gender.
Welfare analysis aggregates people into groups, and so one
applying it may generalize about “men” and “women,” individual
exceptions notwithstanding. In this framework, placing value on
the interests and experiences of women citizen-recipients is a good
idea if it would make societies better off, but a bad one if it would
make societies worse off. Because this extra attention to women
would have the effect of transferring money into women’s hands,
(1993) (emphasizing that civil actions may be more likely than criminal actions to
be prosecuted); Ronen Perry & Yehuda Adar, Wrongful Abortion: A Wrong in
Search of a Remedy, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 507, 585 (2005) (arguing that
“wrongful abortion” creates more deterrence than either tort or criminal liability
can deliver, and proposing that courts make available “an extra-compensatory
civil fine” to be divided between plaintiffs and the state). See generally Richard
Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1135, 1138 (2003) (arguing that whether requiring the payment of compensation
accords with the goal of efficiency is a complex question whose answer depends
on variables). Another prominent economic analyst argues that mandating
compensation to victims is more necessary in the case of intentional torts as
compared with “ordinary” or accidental torts, so as to eliminate inefficient
expenditures in self-protection that victims make. See William M. Landes, Optimal
Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 673 (1983) (“In ordinary
torts, efficiency can be achieved without compensating the victims. In contrast,
efficiency usually requires compensating the victim of an intentional tort to
prevent him from spending resources to avoid the tort.”).
143 See generally SEIBEL, REPARATIONS SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 9, at 7
(providing an illustrative list of various microfinance intuitions contributing to
sustainable economic development).
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the question becomes whether societies are better or worse off
when, other things being equal, women gain control over more
money.144
Evidence indicates that societies will indeed be better off if they
transfer money to women (and if they use microfinance rather than
simple cash payments to effect this transfer) because male and
female adults—the majority of whom in every country have
children—provide for their children unequally. Money in the
hands of a woman is more likely to buy “goods that benefit
children and enhance their capacities.”145 Around the world, men
devote more money to pleasures for themselves—cigarettes,
alcoholic beverages, leisure activities like sports, sexual
conquests—than do women. By contrast, “[s]tudies conducted on
five continents have found that children are distinctly better off”
when their mothers have more money to spend.146
In Kenya, for example, the more income controlled by women
in sugarcane farmer households, the greater the household caloric
intake. In Jamaica, female-headed households spend more on food
and less on alcohol. Data from the Ivory Coast suggest that
doubling the proportion of income controlled by women would
cause a 26%reduction in amounts spent on alcohol and a 14 percent
reduction in money spent on cigarettes. “In Brazil, $1 in the hands
of a Brazilian woman has the same effect on child survival as $18 in
the hands of a man.”147 In richer countries, where calorie counts
are a less reliable proxy for well-being, one finds other indicators.
144 Other welfare effects relating to reparations for women, though beyond
the scope of this Article, warrant brief note here. Researchers have estimated that
violence against women cost the national economy of Nicaragua 1.6% of its GDP
($29.5 million) in 1999, and 2% of the GDP of Chile ($1.56 billion) in 1996. See
Andrew R. Morrison & Maria Beatriz Orlando, Social and Economic Costs of
Domestic Violence: Chile and Nicaragua, in TOO CLOSE TO HOME: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN LATIN AMERICA 51, 57, 61 (Andrew R. Morrison & Maria Loreto Biehl eds., 1999)
(discussing the economic and social costs of domestic violence in Nicaragua and
Chile). To the extent that reparations payments promote stability through civic
engagement and thereby diminish violence against women, national economies
can look forward to becoming more prosperous. Another example is the
correlation between GNP and the enrollment of girls at school. See U.N.
Millennium Project, supra note 124, at 47 (describing how research illustrates that
failure to invest in education for young women results lowers gross national
product).
145 ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT
JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 120 (2001) (footnote omitted).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 121–22.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss1/1

2009

PECUNIARY REPARATIONS AFTER NAT’L CRISIS

49

For example, affluent divorced fathers in the United States are less
likely than their (somewhat less) affluent ex-wives to cooperate
with paying for their children’s college education.148 Around the
world, female legislators introduce and promote more childfriendly government expenditures,149 suggesting a secondary
welfare effect: the more women can avail themselves of education
and other sources of access to civic life, the better off children will
be.150
Experts on economic intervention, who have long recognized
that development-related expenditures that benefit women yield
payoffs to societies, share this assessment:
This claim has now achieved “motherhood” status, in
virtue of the accumulating evidence confirming what has
long been available at an intuitive level, which is that
Id. at 126.
See, e.g., Id. (noting the same pattern in Scandinavia); see generally Matthew
M. Davis & Amy P. Upston, State Legislator Gender and Other Characteristics
Associated With Sponsorship of Child Health Bills, 4 AMBULATORY PEDIATRICS 295
(2004) (reporting study of American state legislatures). Voting rights activist
Carrie Chapman Catt, working for suffrage in the United States, looked at several
other countries where women had the vote in 1915 (including Australia, New
Zealand, Norway, and Finland) to conclude that “wherever women, the
traditional housekeepers of the world, have been given a voice in the government,
public housekeeping has been materially improved by an increased attention to
questions of pure food, pure water supply, sanitation, housing, public health and
morals, child welfare and education.” Carrie Chapman Catt, Do You Know?,
reprinted in WOMAN SUFFRAGE: HISTORY, ARGUMENTS, AND RESULTS 138 (Frances M.
Björkman & Annie G. Porritt eds. 1917).
150 Some criticisms of the Crittenden thesis may be noted briefly. Crittenden
writes that men in governments, especially American governments, dislike
making transfer payments to mothers because they believe—correctly, it turns
out—that money helps women abandon their unsatisfactory relationships with
men. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 145, at 122 (describing how money granted to
poor women during experiments in the 1970s “reduced wives’ financial
dependence on their husbands and increased the probability that an unhappy
wife would pack her bags, scoop up the kids, and leave”). Thus, it may be
prudent to anticipate on our welfare ledger an increase in divorce and the
severance of informal unions (although it appears equally likely that the receipt of
reparations payments would enhance peace and stability in a household).
Children are probably still better off. Another possible criticism: nations could
use excise taxes to pursue the same welfare gains that redistribution in favor of
women would achieve. “Sin” taxation of liquor, cigarettes, motorcycles, brothels
and so on, and could, in theory, generate enough revenue for governments to
enhance child welfare through public programs. However, such an agenda
would burden a transitional democracy trying to repair its recent failure to
uphold the human rights of its citizens. It is probably better to pursue welfare by
putting money into the hands of mothers.
148
149

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

50

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 31:1

“investing in women,” especially in the areas of health and
education, is likely to generate payoffs or “positive
externalities” for the well-being of children, the household,
and the economy as a whole.151
One microcredit leader accordingly decided early in his
banking career to take gender into account in his lending decisions,
believing that the children of low-income parents would profit
more from loans to their mothers.152
Differences between microcredit and microfinance are
pertinent to this welfare perspective. Microcredit has won praise
for making poor women wealthier but also blame for forcing them
to toil in repayment efforts. A harried woman struggling to repay
her loan might feel compelled to draft her children into her
struggling business. Under this pressure, a daughter would
probably look more valuable to her mother as a housekeeper and
child-minder than a student continuing her education. The form of
microfinance proposed here—shares in a financial institution that
carry no repayment obligation—does not generate new pressure to
turn children into laborers. True, it does not eliminate the
deleterious effects on society of financial hardship, but neither does
any other mode of reparation; and even though becoming a
shareholder in a financial institution can disrupt a woman’s life,
the disruptions of microfinance payments that beget no new debt
are much gentler than the disruption of money-lending among the
poor.
And so the scenario of an engaged, decision-making, moneyspending, policy-directing female citizenry becomes attainable—
even likely to develop—and conducive to the good of all persons
in the nation implementing reparations. Wealth in the hands of
women enhances welfare not only for children, as recipients of
expenditures, but also for mothers, as determiners of these
expenditures. Developmental economics regards microfinance as
an especially effective means to maximize the value of an initial
investment.
Thus for purposes of enhancing welfare, the
151 Kerry Rittich, Engendering Development/Marketing Equality, 67 ALB. L. REV.
575, 580 (2003) (footnote omitted). See also WORLD BANK, supra note 121, and
sources cited therein (showing women’s life expectancy increased and gender
gaps in the labor force were reduced according to the level of education women
attained).
152 See Bruck, supra note 60, at 62 (referring to the policies of Mohammad
Yunus and his Grameen Bank).
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combination of female recipients and microfinance presents an
exceptionally high potential yield for a reparations plan.
6.

CONCLUSION

Standing alone, pecuniary reparations leave the effects of
serious human rights violations unrepaired. They do not take
recipients back to an idyllic past where they were safe from largescale horrific wrongdoing. They cannot be rendered in proportion
to the harm suffered. Of themselves, they provide no truth-telling,
nor guarantees of non-recurrence, nor the kind of government and
civil society that fend off wrongdoing before it arises.
These infirmities of pecuniary reparations, though meaningful,
leave intact a quality necessary to effect recognition of wrongs and
an ambition to change current conditions: governments and
individuals who engage in reparation cannot deny the
microeconomic tenet of scarcity. The phrase “cheap talk” adverts
to the infinite supply of words available to the disingenuous or
distracted, who can denounce past ills with endless verbiage, never
having to surrender anything they value enough to hold.153 A
recipient of pecuniary reparations, by contrast, knows that the
payer has parted with something scarce in order to affirm the truth
of what happened to her. This monetary acknowledgement does
not of itself correct the wrong, but it honors her experience,
augments her agency, holds potential to increase her security and
her freedom, and invites her concretely, as a holder of power, into
the emergent civil society.
Once identified as integral to the larger reparative endeavor of
recovering nation, pecuniary reparations ought to take the form
that best advances the agency, recognition, security, and freedom
of injured citizens. This ideal form will seldom be simple transfer
payments. Cash is too easy for a recipient to forfeit, alienate, and
lose. The alternative presented in this article—establishing each
recipient as shareholder of a financial institution—conveys money
to her in honor of the nation’s past, where she suffered a wrong,
and its future, which her choices and prerogatives will shape.

See de Greiff, supra note 6, at 461 (explaining that without reparations,
victims may view mere truth-telling as an empty gesture).
153
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